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BOOK REVIEW
DO INTERNATIONAL NORMS INFLUENCE
STATE BEHAVIOR?
DAVID SLOSS*

The Limits of InternationalLaw. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
New York: Oxford University Press, 2005. Pp. 262, $ 29.95
(hardcover)
I.

INTRODUCTION

For the past few decades, lawyers and social scientists have been
trying to explain why states do or do not comply with international
law. Broadly speaking, prevailing theories on the issue of compliance can be divided into three groups. One group of theorists
focuses on state interests as the key determinant of state behavior
in the international system. Within this group, neorealists assume
that states are primarily interested in maximizing power' whereas
neoliberals take a broader view of state interests, viewing both
wealth and power as important state interests. 2 Both groups, however, take state interests as a given, and seek to explain state behavior in the international system in terms of state interests.
The other two groups of theorists, by contrast, believe that state
interests themselves require explanation. Instead of taking state
interests as a given, these theorists examine the forces that shape
states' preferences. One group of theorists focuses on domestic
political forces that shape states' foreign policy decisions.3
Another group focuses on the ways in which international norms
4
and institutions influence state interests and state behavior.
*

Associate Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. J.D. 1996, Stan-

ford Law School; M.P.P. 1983, The Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University;
B.A. 1981, Hampshire College.
1. See, e.g., KENNETH WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT 0. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY. COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN THE
WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984)
3. See, e.g., MORTON H. HALPERIN, BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS AND FOREIGN POLICY
(1974).
4. See, e.g., MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
(1996).
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Though a variety of labels attach to different schools of thought,
this Review will refer to the three types of theories as "state interest" theories, "domestic politics" theories, and "international
5
norms" theories.
International legal scholars who have attempted to explain why
states comply with international law typically endorse some variant
of international norms theory. 6 By contrast, Professors Goldsmith
and Posner's recent book, The Limits of InternationalLaw (Limits),
7
falls squarely within the long tradition of state interest theories.
Limits contends that states comply with international law when it is
in their interest to do so, and that "international law emerges from
states acting rationally to maximize their interests."" Limits combines some new material with revised versions of several previously
published articles. 9 By integrating these materials in a single volume, Limits constitutes Goldsmith and Posner's first attempt to
articulate a comprehensive theory of international law.
Limits contends that most state behavior associated with international law can be explained in terms of four basic models, which
are labeled "coercion," "cooperation," "coordination" and "coincidence of interest." 10 The simplicity of this theory is one of the
book's greatest strengths. Limits uses these four models to explain
an extraordinarily wide range of state behavior, including the crea5. This tripartite classification is similar to a framework suggested by Professor
Sagan. See Scott D. Sagan, Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a
Bomb, 21 INr'L SECURITY 54-86 (Winter 1996-97) (discussing a "security model," a "domestic politics model," and a "norms model").
6. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AmONG NATIONS 26 (1990)
(asserting that "legitimacy exerts a pull to compliance which is powered by the quality of
the rule or of the rule-making institution and not by coercive authority"); Harold Hongju
Koh, Why Do Nations Obey InternationalLaw?, 106 YALE LJ. 2599, 2645-46 (1997) (claiming
that "the key to better compliance is more internalized compliance," and that norm internalization is the product of transnational legal process).
7. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005)
[hereinafter LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW].
8. Id. at 3.
9. SeeJack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, InternationalAgreements: A Rational Choice
Approach, 44 VA. J. IN-r'L L. 113 (2003); Eric A. Posner, Do States Have a Moral Obligation to
Comply with InternationalLaw?, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1901 (2003); Jack L. Goldsmith, Liberal
Democracy and CosmopolitanDuty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1667 (2003);Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A.
Posner, Moral and Legal Rhetoric in InternationalRelations: A Rational Choice Perspective, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. 115 (2002);Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, Understandingthe Resemblance
Between Modern and TraditionalCustomary InternationalLaw, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 639 (2000);
Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary InternationalLaw, 66 U. CHICACO
L. REv. 1113 (1999).
10. LimITs OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 26-35.
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tion, modification, and subsequent compliance with both treaty
law and customary international law.
The simplicity of the theory presented in Limits, however, is also
the book's greatest weakness. Limits assumes that "state interests at
any particular time [are] an unexplained given."'" By adopting
this simplifying assumption, Limits largely ignores the insights
developed by domestic politics theorists. Whereas the authors are
merely indifferent to domestic politics theories, they are openly
hostile to international norms theories. Indeed, one of the
authors' main goals is to persuade readers that international norms
do not influence state behavior. They fail to accomplish that goal.
This Review presents a critical assessment of the theory
presented in Limits. Part I provides a brief summary of Goldsmith
and Posner's theory. Part II tests the theory by analyzing the evolution of international law and state practice, especially U.S. practice,
related to the juvenile death penalty. Part III tests the theory by
analyzing the evolution of China's policy and practice related to
nuclear proliferation. The analysis in Parts II and III demonstrates
that the United States and China have both altered their policies
and practices to conform to international norms. If powerful states
such as these modify their behavior to conform to international
norms, one may infer that weaker states are even more likely to be
influenced by international law. Therefore, contrary to one of the
central claims advanced in Limits, this Review suggests that interna12
tional norms do influence the behavior of states.
II.

A

SUMMARY OF GOLDSMITH AND POSNER'S THEORY

The analysis in Limits is divided into three parts. Parts I and II
present Goldsmith and Posner's core theory of international law.
Part I addresses customary international law; Part II addresses treaties. As Part III is primarily a response to critics of Goldsmith and
Posner's earlier work, this Review will focus primarily on the theory
presented in Parts I and II.
11. Id. at 8-9.
12. There is a substantial body of empirical evidence showing that international
norms and institutions influence state behavior. See, e.g., FINNEMORE, supra note 4, at
34-127 (presenting case studies in three different issue areas where international norms
and institutions have influenced state behavior); Ryan Goodman & DerekJinks, Toward an
Institutional Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1749, 1762-80 (2003) (summarizing
empirical evidence that states exhibit a variety of institutional and organizational similarities resulting from global forces that induce states to imitate other states). The case studies
presented in this essay are intended to make a small contribution to an already large body
of literature.
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Goldsmith and Posner set forth three assumptions that frame
their theory of international law. First, they assume that states are
the primary actors in the international legal system. 13 Second, they
assume that states have interests; they define "state interests" as the
preferences of the state's political leadership. 14 They do not
equate state interests with welfare maximization. If the state's political leadership prefers an outcome that is not welfare maximizing,
that outcome is still the state interest because it is the outcome
preferred by the political leadership. Third, borrowing heavily
from rational choice theory, they assume that states act rationally
to achieve their preferred outcomes. 15 While they concede that, as
a practical matter, states sometimes behave irrationally, Goldsmith
and Posner claim that overall their "assumptions lead to better and
more nuanced explanations of state behavior related to interna'16
tional law than other theories do."
Although they generally refrain from making assumptions about
the content of state interests, they do "exclude one preference
from the state's interest calculation: a preference for complying
with international law."1 7 One of Goldsmith and Posner's central
aims in this book is to explain state compliance with international
law solely by reference to state interests. If they admitted that states
have an interest in complying with international law, the explanation of compliance in terms of state interests would be tautological.
Hence, they explicitly assume that states do not have an interest in
complying with international law.
After setting forth these central assumptions, Limits presents four
models of state behavior: coincidence of interest, coercion, cooperation, and coordination. Goldsmith and Posner's central claim is
that these four models explain virtually all state behavior related to
international law, including both treaty law and customary law.
Specifically, they contend that their four models explain state decisions involving creation of international law, modification of international law, and compliance or non-compliance with
international law."' Since the four models play a central role in
their analysis, a brief discussion of each is necessary.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 4-5.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

6.
7-10.
7-8.
9.
10-14.
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Coincidence of interest describes a situation in which states
behave in a manner consistent with international norms simply
because it is in their interest to do so. According to Limits, much of
the content of traditional customary international law can be
explained by a coincidence of interest model. 19 For example, Limits provides a detailed analysis of the so-called Paquete Habana
rule. 20 At the end of the nineteenth century, customary law generally permitted the capture of enemy ships during times of war. In
The Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court, after conducting a thorough review of international custom, held that coastal fishing vessels were exempt from the right of capture. 21 Goldsmith and
Posner claim "that coincidence of interest accounts for most, but
probably not all, of the behavioral patterns associated with the
Paquete Habana rule." 22 States refrained from capturing coastal
fishing vessels when they had no interest in doing so. The rule
permitted capture, however, where states had an interest in capturing fishing vessels-e.g., where those vessels posed a military
23
threat.
Coercion describes a situation in which a weak state behaves in
accordance with a "rule" because a strong state forces the weak
24
state to behave in accordance with the strong state's interests.
For example, Limits analyzes the "free ships, free goods" principle,
which holds that enemy property on a neutral power's ship is
immune from seizure during wartime. 25 During the Russo-Japanese War, "the Russian Navy harassed, seized, and sometimes sank
U.S., German, and British ships" in apparent violation of the "free
ships, free goods" rule. 2 6 When Britain and the United States
threatened retaliation, however, Russia modified its behavior to
conform to the rule. 2 7 According to Limits, Russia's compliance
with the "free ships, free goods" principle is best explained by the
coercion model.
Cooperation, under Goldsmith and Posner's theory, explains
states responses to a bilateral repeated prisoner's dilemma. 28 A
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 27-28.
See id. at 66-78. See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
Paquele Habana, 175 U.S. at 708.

22.

LIMITS OF IN TERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 76.

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 28-29.
See id. at 45-54.
Id. at 50-51.
Id. at 51.
See id. at 29-32.
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prisoner's dilemma arises when two states, each rationally pursuing
its own interests, would achieve an outcome that makes both of
them worse off. In contrast, if the states cooperate, they can
achieve an outcome that benefits both. 29 A bilateral arms race is a
classic example. The preferred outcome for each state is to build
enough weapons to achieve military superiority, but if each state
independently seeks to attain military superiority, both states will
be worse off because they will both spend a lot of money without
attaining their goal. 30 Both states, therefore, are better off if they
cooperate by agreeing to arms control limitations. From each
state's perspective, a negotiated arms control agreement is a worse
outcome than military superiority, but it is a better outcome than
would result from independent action. Limits contends that many
international agreements result from cooperative efforts to avoid
3
the unwanted effects of prisoner's dilemmas. '
Coordination is Goldsmith and Posner's fourth model.3 2 The
concept of coordination is best illustrated by using a domestic
example. All automobile drivers have a rational self-interest in
ensuring that there is a clear, consistent rule specifying whether
they should drive on the left side or the right side of the road. This
is a classic coordination problem because drivers have a strong
interest in ensuring that there is a uniform rule, but they have no
preference for any particular rule. 33 The "battle of the sexes" game
is a variant of a coordination game where "one party might do better in one equilibrium while the other party does better in a second equilibrium." 34 Goldsmith and Posner cite the example of a
treaty on wireless communications. 35 This issue presents a coordination problem "because all states preferred coordinating on some
standard rather than on none." 36 Treaty negotiations, however,
presented a battle of the sexes problem because "some standards
37
benefited certain states more than others."

29. Id. at 30-32.
30. This assumes that neither state has the capability to achieve military superiority by
out-spending its rival.
31. See LiMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 85-88.

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

id. at 32-35 (summarizing the coordination model).
at 12.
at 33.
at 33-34
at 34.
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THE UNITED STATES AND THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY

It is now widely agreed that customary international law prohibits the 'juvenile death penalty"-the practice of imposing capital
punishment on individuals who committed crimes when they were
less than eighteen years of age. 38 As of this writing, every country
in the world except for the United States has undertaken a treaty
obligation banning the juvenile death penalty. 39 Despite having
refused to undertake such a treaty obligation, the United States
recently incorporated this norm into its domestic law by means of a
Supreme Court decision that re-interpreted the Eighth Amendment to prohibit the juvenile death penalty. 40 This section tests
Goldsmith and Posner's theory by applying it to the juvenile death
penalty issue. The analysis is divided into three parts: First, does
their theory explain why states entered into treaties that prohibit
the juvenile death penalty? Second, does their theory explain the
emergence of the customary norm? Third, does their theory
explain why the United States ultimately internalized the norm
after resisting domestic incorporation for many years?
38. See, e.g., FRANK C. NEWMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW, POLICY,
AND PROCESS 708-17 (3d ed. 2001) (summarizing evidence of state practice and opiniojuris
supporting view that customary international law prohibits the juvenile death penalty);
Connie de la Vega, Amici Curiae Urge the US. Supreme Court to Consider InternationalHuman
Rights Law in Juvenile Death Penalty Case, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1041 (2002) (reproducing
amicus brief submitted to the U.S. Supreme Court in support of cert. petition urging
review of Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2001)); Michael Domingues v. United
States, Case 12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 62/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, doc. 1 rev.
1 (2002) (holding that there is "a norm of international customary law.., prohibiting the
execution of offenders under the age of 18 years at the time of their crime"), available at
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA.12285.htn (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
Even Professor Bradley, who is generally skeptical about customary international law
claims, seemingly accepts the view that the juvenile death penalty ban is now an established
rule of customary international law. See Curtis A. Bradley, The Juvenile Death Penalty and
InternationalLaw, 52 DUKE L.J. 485, 518 (2002) (suggesting that the customary law norm
"crystallized" between 1990 and 2000).
39. The Convention on the Rights of the Child prohibits capital punishment "for
offences committed by persons below eighteen years of age." Convention on the Rights of
the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3, 55 [hereinafter CRC]. There are now
192 parties to the treaty. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General:
Status as at 31 December 2004, 306, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/23 (2005) [hereinafter
Multilateral Treaties]. The official figure of 192 state parties includes every country in the
world except for the United States and Somalia. Id. Somalia accepted a treaty obligation
prohibiting the juvenile death penalty when in 1990 it acceded to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 6, 1 5, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, S. Exec. Doc.
E, 95-2 (1978) [hereinafter ICCPR]. See Multilateral Treaties, supra, at 174.
40. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). For further discussion of Simmons, see
inftra notes 74-77 and 103-34 and accompanying text.
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Treaties That Prohibit the Juvenile Death Penalty

The norm prohibiting the juvenile death penalty is embodied in
several treaties, including the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR),' 4 the American Convention on Human
Rights (ACHR),42 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC).43 According to Limits, the decision to incorporate a norm
such as this into a treaty cannot be explained solely by coincidence
of interest; "[i]f each state would engage in the same action for
self-interested reasons regardless of what the other state does, then
there would be no reason to invest resources to enter an agreement codifying the behavior." 44 According to Limits, therefore,
"[t]he basic logic of international agreements ... follows directly
from the models of cooperation and coordination."'45
Specifically, Limits contends that multilateral human rights treaties generally solve coordination problems by establishing a " 'code
of conduct' that powerful liberal democracies deem important to
establish." 46 Goldsmith and Posner assume that liberal states link
various incentives and disincentives to other states' compliance
with human rights standards. 47 Given this assumption, they argue,
"it is to the benefit of all liberal states to agree with some specificity
on the actions that are permitted under the standard . . . and
actions that are not permitted." 48
This explanation makes sense if-but only if-liberal states are
concerned about the human rights practices of other states. If liberal states were not concerned about the human rights practices of
other states, they would have no reason to provide incentives for
other states to comply with human rights norms or disincentives
for non-compliance. Moreover, if liberal states did not link various
incentives and disincentives to compliance with human rights standards, there would be no benefit to reaching agreement on the
actions that are permitted and prohibited. The validity of the coordination theory set forth in Limits, therefore, depends critically on
the assumption that liberal states are concerned about the human
rights practices of other states.
41. ICCPR, supra note 39.
42. American Convention on Human Rights art. 4, 5, Nov. 21, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No.
36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 (1969) [hereinafter ACHR].
43. CRC, supra note 39.
44. LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 88.
45. Id. at 84.
46. Id. at 128.
47. Id. at 130.
48. Id.
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Recognizing this point, Limits suggests two reasons why states are
interested in the human rights behavior of other states. First, some
people have altruistic concerns about the well-being of persons in
other states, and those concerns sometimes influence government
policy. 49 Second, "an important school of thought holds that liberal democracies do not go to war with one another, and are better
trading partners." 50 Accordingly, some states "have an interest in
improving the way other states treat their citizens in order to
expand trade, minimize war, and promote international stability." 51 In short, states are motivated by altruistic concerns and
52
instrumental interests.
Even if one assumes that the creation of multilateral human
rights treaties was motivated in part by instrumental interests in
trade and security, it is implausible to claim that these types of
instrumental concerns were the primary motivation for states to
enter into human rights treaties. Altruism is clearly an important
part of the story. The altruism rationale, however, poses a dilemma
for Goldsmith and Posner's overall theory because the authors cannot decide whether to classify altruism as a "state interest." If altruism is not classified as a "state interest," then they are forced to
admit that states are motivated by factors other than state interests,
which would be contrary to one of the central assumptions of their
theory. 53 But, if altruism is classified as a "state interest," their con54
cept of state interests is so broad that it is virtually meaningless.
The explanatory power of the theory derives from the fact that it
purports to explain a wide range of state behavior in terms of
states' rational pursuit of their interests. If the concept of "state
49. Id. at 110.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Goldsmith and Posner also suggest a third reason why states are interested in the
human rights practices of other states: "people who live in one state care about the wellbeing of coreligionists, coethnics, and conationals living in other states, and this concern
can translate into governmental interest and action." Id. at 109. Identification with conationals in neighboring states was clearly a prime motivation for the bilateral minority rights
treaties that European states concluded in the early twentieth century. See HENRY J.
STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS,
MORALS 93-103 (2d ed. 2000)

(discussing minority rights treaties that were common in
Europe after World War I). This identity rationale, however, does not explain states' motivation for entering into multilateral human rights treaties because those treaties are
designed to protect individuals of all religions and nationalities.

53.

See LIMITS

OF INTERNATIONAL

LAw, supra note 7, at 7 ("Our theory of international

law assumes that states act rationally to maximize their interests.").
54. Goldsmith and Posner define state interests as the preferences of the state's political leadership. See id. at 6. Under this definition, it would seem that altruism does qualify
as a state interest if the political leadership chooses to act altruistically.
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interests" is sufficiently broad to include altruism, then "state interests" effectively includes all factors that motivate state behavior. In
that case, the central thesis of Limits reduces to the claim that state
behavior can be explained in terms of the factors that motivate
state behavior. While that is undoubtedly true, it is not very
illuminating.
In sum, Goldsmith and Posner claim that states enter into multilateral human rights treaties, including treaties prohibiting the
juvenile death penalty, in order to solve coordination problems.
That claim depends critically on the assumption that states have an
interest in the human rights behavior of other states. Analysis of
that assumption reveals that Goldsmith and Posner's concept of
"state interests" is so broad that it vitiates the explanatory power of
their theory.
B.

Emergence of Customary InternationalLaw

Customary international law is defined as a "general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation." 55 There are two elements to this definition: 1) the general
and consistent practice of states (which Goldsmith and Posner call
"behavioral regularity"); and 2) the sense of legal obligation, or
opinio juris.

56

With regard to the juvenile death penalty, as of 2005, there is
little doubt that the behavioral regularity element is satisfied.
According to a 2003 report by Amnesty International, only six
countries other than the United States have executed juvenile
offenders since 1990: Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Nigeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Iran. 57 All six have either terminated the practice of executing juvenile offenders, or have denied
that they engage in the practice. Yemen enacted legislation in
1994 to raise the minimum age of eligibility to eighteen; Pakistan
enacted similar legislation in 2000. Saudi Arabia ratified the CRC
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102(2) (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
56. Id.
57. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE ExCLUSION OF CHILD OFFENDERS FROM THE
DEATH PENALTY UNDER GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003)
[hereinafter Amnesty
Report], available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/pdf/ACT500042003ENGLISH/$
File/ACT5000403.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). Unless otherwise specified, the information in this paragraph is based upon the Amnesty Report. Other information indicates
that China also executed one juvenile offender in 2003. However, "China abolished the
juvenile death penalty in 1997; the lone execution of ajuvenile offender reportedly carried
out in 2003 was illegal." Brief for Respondent at 49 n.107, Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct.
1183 (2005) (No. 03-633).
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in 1996 and has not executed a juvenile offender since 1992.
Amnesty International reports that Nigeria carried out a single execution in 1997, but a Nigerian representative told the UN SubCommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights
"that the offender was well over eighteen at the time of the offense
and . . . any juveniles convicted of capital offenses have their

sentences cummuted."5 s Congo executed a 14-year-old child soldier in 2000. In response to appeals from representatives of the
United Nations and the European Union, however, Congo commuted the sentences of four other child soldiers in 2001. Moreover, Congo reported to the Committee on the Rights of the Child
that "children guilty of offences punishable by the death sentence
were admitted to rehabilitation centres."5 9 Iran testified as follows
before an international committee: "[I]n the past 20 years death
sentences had been handed down for three people who had been
under eighteen at the time of their crimes; in all three cases the
Supreme Court had ruled against execution." 60 Finally, as noted
above, a recent U.S. Supreme Court ruling effectively terminated
the U.S. practice of executing juvenile offenders. 61 It thus appears
that the juvenile death penalty has been abolished everywhere.
Given that the behavior regularity element is satisfied, Goldsmith
and Posner's theory questions whether state practice fulfills the
opinio juris element. They claim that many of the behavioral regularities in the international system do not result from states acting
out of a sense of legal obligation. Rather, observed behavioral regularities are better explained by reference to the four models of
62
coercion, cooperation, coordination, and coincidence of interest.
Although they do not explicitly discuss the juvenile death penalty
in this context, they would presumably explain the observed behavioral regularity in this area in terms of coincidence of interest.
States generally do not have an interest in executing individuals
who committed crimes as juveniles; accordingly, they refrain from
executing such individuals. There is no rule of customary law in
cases where a behavioral regularity results from coincidence of
58. De la Vega, supra note 38, at 1048.
59. Amnesty Report, supra note 57, at 23.
60. Id. at 24. Since publication of the Amnesty Report, Iran has allegedly executed
one additional juvenile offender. See Nazila Fathi, Rights Advocates Condemn Iranfor Executing 2 Young Men, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2005.
61. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183.
62. See, e.g., LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 39 ("States do not act in
accordance with a rule that they feel obliged to follow; they act because it is in their interest to do so. The rule does not cause the states' behavior; it reflects their behavior.")
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interest because the opinio juris element is not satisfied. 63 Goldsmith and Posner's theory, therefore, leads to the conclusion that
the prohibition on the juvenile death penalty is not actually a rule
of customary international law.
The preceding analysis is inadequate in three important
respects. First, Goldsmith and Posner's theory creates an untenable dichotomy between law and the moral norms embodied in the
law. For example, consider their analysis of genocide. While they
agree that genocide and crimes against humanity are "morally
abhorrent" they insist that "the law does not supply the motivation"
for states' decisions to refrain from acts of genocide. 64 This argument is misleading because it fails to acknowledge that many laws
are expressions of widely shared moral commitments. This is especially true of international human rights law. The laws prohibiting
genocide and the juvenile death penalty, for example, are both
expressions of norms that are generally accepted within the international community. The laws exist because those norms are
widely accepted and state behavior conforms to the law because the
norms are widely accepted. The authors' claim that "the law does
not supply the motivation," therefore, is true only insofar as there
is a distinction between the law itself and the norm that the law
expresses. But, that is a distinction without a difference. The law is
an expression of moral norms. The best explanation of the
observed behavioral regularities in these areas is that states do not
engage in genocide or the juvenile death penalty because they are
morally committed to the norms embodied in international
65
human rights law.
Second, the theory presented in Limits fails to distinguish
between a state's interests and a state's moral commitments. Limits
suggests that states do not commit acts of genocide and do not
execute children because they have no interest in doing so. This is
analogous to saying that individuals do not commit incest because
they have no interest in doing so. Such an explanation of the common practice of refraining from incest is misleading because it fails
63. See id. at 38 (contending that "a behavioral regularity that arises from" coincidence of interest, coercion, cooperation, or coordination, is not "an example of customary
international law").
64. Id. at 111.
65. This statement is not meant to imply that every state is morally committed to every
norm embodied in every international human rights treaty. That is obviously not true. At
this point in time, though, every state, or almost every state, is committed to the norms
prohibiting genocide and the juvenile death penalty. The widely shared moral commitment to these norms satisfies the opiniojuris element of customary international law.
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to account for the fact that the prohibition against incest is a
deeply held and widely shared moral principle. States, like individuals, have moral commitments; it is a mistake to confuse those
moral commitments with state interests. 66 Goldsmith and Posner's
theory is descriptively inaccurate because it treats states' moral
commitments as another variant of state interests.
Finally, one must consider the evolution of state practice related
to the juvenile death penalty. Historical data is sparse, but it is
reasonable to assume that the practice of executing individuals
who committed crimes at age fifteen, for example, was fairly widespread fifty years ago. 67 Assuming that many states engaged in the
practice fifty years ago and that no states engage in the practice
today, 68 the question arises: "Why did state practice change?"
Goldsmith and Posner's answer is that state practice changed
because state interests changed. 69 That answer is unsatisfactory
because Limits does not offer any theory as to why state interests
change, except to insist that state interests do not change in
70
response to changes in international law.
In the case of the juvenile death penalty, however, the evidence
suggests that state practice has changed in response to international law. There is disagreement about when the international
norm prohibiting the juvenile death penalty crystallized as a rule of
customary international law, but the rule began to emerge in the
66. Those who doubt that states have moral commitments should consider the common usage of the term "American values." Democracy is an "American value," not a state
interest. National security is a "state interest," not an American value.
67. Execution ofjuvenile offenders who were less than eighteen at the time they committed their crimes has been a consistent feature of U.S. criminal law since the country
gained independence from Great Britain. See infra note 77. Data about the age limits
applied by other countries at different points in time is not available. A report by the U.N.
Secretary General, however, lists 77 countries that are completely abolitionist, 15 countries
that are abolitionist for ordinary crimes only, and 37 countries that are "de facto" abolitionist. See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Status of the
International Covenants on Human Rights, Question of the Death Penalty, Report of the SecretaryGeneral Submitted Pursuant to Commission Resolution 2003/67, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/86
(Jan. 23, 2004), availableat http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/capital/E-CN-4-2004-86.pdf
(last visited Oct. 18, 2005). A substantial majority of the abolitionist countries did not halt
the practice of capital punishment until after 1960. See id. Thus, prior to 1960, most countries in the world practiced capital punishment. There is no reason to think that their laws
on execution ofjuvenile offenders were more restrictive than the laws in the United States.
68. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
69. Goldsmith and Posner do not make this claim explicitly, but it follows logically
from their view "that states act rationally to maximize their interests." LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 7.
70.

See id. at 8-10.
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1950s or 1960s, 7 1 and was firmly established by the late 1990s, if not
earlier. 72 As of 1990, there were only seven countries in the world
that retained the juvenile death penalty. Since that time, all seven
have abolished the practice.7 3 Limits explains this development as
a "coincidence of interest." It suggests that these states changed
their interests, for independent reasons, and that it is merely coin74
cidental that these changes occurred over the course of a decade.
That explanation defies credulity. The fact that all these states
changed their behavior in a relatively brief time period while the
norm was crystallizing-or after the norm had already crystallized,
depending upon one's view of the timing issue-provides compelling evidence that they changed their behavior in order to conform
to the international norm. While space limits preclude a detailed
defense of that proposition with respect to all seven countries, the
next section of this Review demonstrates that international law had
a substantial impact on the U.S. decision to halt the execution of
juvenile offenders.
C.

The United States and the Juvenile Death Penalty

The Supreme Court recently held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the execution of criminals who were
less than eighteen years old at the time they committed their
crimes. 75 The Court's decision in Roper v. Simmons (Simmons)
effected a dramatic reversal of the U.S. position in at least three
71. The origins of the rule are properly traced to the drafting of the ICCPR and the
ACHR. For analysis of the drafting history of the juvenile death penalty rule within those
treaties, see Joan F. Hartman, "Unusual" Punishment: The Domestic Effects of International
Norms Restricting the Application of the Death Penalty, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 655, 671-73, 680-81,
684-85 (1983). Some commentators trace the origins of the rule to the drafting of the
Geneva Conventions in the 1940s. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War prohibits the execution ofjuveniles. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 68, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 3560, 75 U.N.T.S. 286, 350. That rule, however, applies only to wartime
detainees, and is not a general ban on the execution ofjuvenile offenders.
72. Professor Bradley contends that the rule prohibiting the juvenile death penalty
did not crystallize until the mid-to-late 1990s. See Bradley, supra note 38, at 518-20. Other
commentators contend that the rule was established earlier. See, e.g., Hartman, supra note
71, at 665-82 (contending that customary rule was established by 1983); Ved P. Nanda, The
United States Reservation to the Ban on the Death PenaltyforJuvenile Offenders: An Appraisal Under
the International Covenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1311, 1332-39
(1993) (contending that both state practice and opiniojuriswere established by 1993). For
purposes of this article, it is unnecessary to resolve the debate over when the norm
crystallized.
73. See supra notes 57-61 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
75. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005).
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respects. First, Simmons expressly overruled a 1989 decision in
which the Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not prohibit execution of juvenile offenders who were sixteen or seventeen at the time they committed their crimes.7 6 Second, Simmons
reversed more than two hundred years of practice; execution of
juvenile offenders had been a consistent feature of U.S. criminal
77
law since the country gained independence from Great Britain.
Third, Simmons effectively terminated a national policy that was
applied by both Democratic and Republican administrations for
almost thirty years. Indeed, at least since 1977, the United States
has consistently expressed its unwillingness to be bound by the
international norm prohibiting the juvenile death penalty.7 8
The Simmons decision raises an important question: Why did the
United States suddenly incorporate the international norm into its
own Constitution after consistently resisting the domestic application of the norm since 1977? This section presents a two-part analysis of that question. The first part summarizes U.S. opposition
over the past few decades to the domestication of the international
norm. The second part contends that Goldsmith and Posner's theory cannot explain the U.S. decision to accept the prohibition on
the juvenile death penalty. One of the central claims advanced in
Limits is that states do not alter their behavior to conform to international norms. The case study of the United States and the juvenile death penalty demonstrates that international norms do
influence state behavior, at least in some cases.
1.

U.S. Opposition to Domestic Application of the
International Norm

This Review assumes that the international norm prohibiting the
juvenile death penalty is now an established rule of customary
76. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). The Court had previously held that
the Constitution prohibits the execution ofjuvenile offenders who were less than sixteen at
the time they committed their crimes. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
77. See Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for Children: The American Experience with Capital
Punishment for Crimes Committed While Under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA L. REv. 613, 614-31
(1983) (analyzing history of juvenile death penalty in the United States). At the time Professor Streib wrote this article, there had not been an execution of a juvenile offender in
the United States since 1964. See id. at 631. The practice of executing juvenile offenders,
however, resumed in 1985 when Texas executed Charles Rumbaugh. SeeVIcTOR L. STREiB,
THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE
CRIMES, JANUARY 1 1973 TO DECEMBER 31, 2004 (2005) [hereinafter STREIB, THE JUVENILE
PENALTY TODAY], www.law.onu.edu/faculty/streib/documents/uvDeathDec2004.
pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). During the period 1985-2004, twenty-two juvenile offenders were executed in the United States, including Mr. Rumbaugh. See id.
78. See infta notes 79-103 and accompanying text.
DEATH
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international law.79 Whether the United States was bound by that
norm prior to the Supreme Court decision in Simmons is a more
controversial question.8 0 The answer to that question depends
upon two variables: when the rule of customary law ceased to be an
emerging norm, and became an established rule; and whether the
United States expressed its opposition to the rule early enough and
often enough to satisfy the requirements of the "persistent objector" rule.8 1 For the purposes of this Review, it is not necessary to
answer these questions. The key point for present purposes is that
the United States consistently expressed its opposition to the
domestic application of the international norm, beginning at least
as early as 1977 and continuing until the Simmons decision.8 2 This
point is important because the history of U.S. opposition shows
that the U.S. political leadership had a strong, consistent preference for preserving the U.S. prerogative to execute juvenile
offenders.
In 1977 President Carter transmitted four human rights treaties
to the Senate. 83 Two of those treaties, the ICCPR 84 and the
ACHR,8 5 contained provisions prohibiting the juvenile death penalty. When President Carter transmitted those treaties to the Senate, he recommended reservations to both treaties to preserve the
U.S. right to execute juvenile offenders.8 6 The Senate deferred
action on both treaties for more than a decade. In 1991 President
George H. W. Bush urged the Senate to renew its consideration of
79. See supra note 38.
80. Compare de la Vega, supra note 38, at 1050-52 (arguing that the United States is
bound by the international norm), with Bradley, supranote 38, at 516-35 (arguing that the
United States is not bound because it has been a persistent objector).
81. The persistent objector rule provides generally that a state is not bound by a rule
of customary international law if that state consistently objected to the rule before it
became firmly established as a rule of customary international law. See RESTATEMENT, supra
note 55, § 102 cmt. d.
82. There is some evidence of U.S. opposition to the juvenile death penalty rule prior
to 1977, but that evidence is weak and inconsistent. See Bradley, supra note 38, at 520-25
(discussing reaction of the United States to various treaty provisions dealing with the death
penalty during the period from the late 1940s to the late 1970s).
83. Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, S. Exec. Docs. C, D, E, and F, 95-2 (1978) [hereinafter Carter
Message].
84. ICCPR, supra note 39.
85. ACHR, supra note 42.
86. See Carter Message, supra note 83, at XII (recommending a reservation to article 6
of the ICCPR because "United States law is not entirely in accord" with the standards for
capital punishment contained in that article); id. at XVIII (recommending a reservation to
article 4 of the ACHR for similar reasons).
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the ICCPR.8 7 The United States ultimately ratified the ICCPR in
1992, with a reservation preserving the U.S. right to execute juvenile offenders. 88 The United States has still not ratified the ACHR
or the CRC. Thus, the United States has consistently refused to
accept a treaty obligation prohibiting the juvenile death penalty.
Similarly, the United States has consistently argued either that
customary law does not prohibit the juvenile death penalty, or that
it is not bound by the asserted norm. Since the 1980s various transnational actors have presented arguments before different international bodies alleging that the United States is legally bound by the
international norm prohibiting the juvenile death penalty. The
United States has consistently contested these arguments.8 9 For
example, in 1985 two juvenile offenders from the United States
presented claims before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights (IACHR),9° asserting that the application of capital
punishment in their cases would violate U.S. obligations under the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man.9' The
United States vigorously contested the merits of their claims, arguing that it had no international legal obligation to refrain from
executing juvenile offenders.9 2 The United States executed both
87. See Senate Comm. On Foreign Relations, Report on the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 2 (1992) [hereinafter ICCPR
Report].
88. See Multilateral Treaties, supra note 39, at 174.
89. While space limitations preclude a detailed exposition of U.S. objections, this section does provide a brief summary of the history of U.S. objections. For a more comprehensive presentation, see Bradley, supra note 38, at 520-35.
90. See Jay Pinkerton and James Terry Roach, Case 9647, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report.
No. 147, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.71, doc. 9, rev. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Pinkerton and Roach].
The IACHR is one of the principal organs of the Organization of American States (OAS),
an international organization of which the United States is a member. See Charter of the
Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 US.T. 2394, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
OAS Charter]. Under the Charter, the IACHR is empowered to "keep vigilance over the
observance of human rights." See Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States art. 150, Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607, 701, 721 U.N.T.S. 324, 376
(entered into force Feb. 27, 1970) [hereinafter Protocol of Amendment to OAS Charter].
91. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. Res. XXX, at 7,
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/ser.L/V./I.4, rev. XX (1948). The American Declaration was originally
adopted as a non-binding declaration of principles. OAS member states later amended the
OAS Charter to give the IACHR authority to oversee national implementation of the
human rights principles embodied in the American Declaration. See Thomas Buergenthal,
The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 828 (1975).
Since that time, the IACHR has maintained that the American Declaration imposes binding obligations on OAS member states. See Pinkerton and Roach, supra note 90,
44-49.
The U.S. has consistently disagreed with the view that the American Declaration imposes
binding obligations on the United States.
92. For a summary of the U.S. argument, see Pinkerton and Roach, supra note 90
38; Bradley, supra note 38, at 527-30.

HeinOnline -- 38 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 175 2006

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 38

petitioners while their claims were still pending before the
93
IACHR.
Several years later, the continued use of the juvenile death penalty in the United States became a subject of controversy in the
Human Rights Committee (HRC) .94 In accordance with Article 40
of the ICCPR, the United States submitted its initial report to the
HRC in 1994. 9 5 The HRC reviewed the report in the spring of
1995.96 In its comments on the U.S. report, the HRC stated
expressly that the U.S. reservation to the juvenile death penalty
provision was "incompatible with the object and purpose of the
treaty." 97 A reservation that fails the "object and purpose" test is
invalid. 98 The United States vigorously defended the validity of its
reservation, contending that customary international law does not
establish "a clear prohibition at the age of 18," and that "there was
no basis in international law for the view that a reservation could
not be made to a provision of a treaty which reflected customary
international law." 99
Since the United States became a party to the ICCPR, there have
been several domestic court cases in which capital defendants have
invoked international law in support of the argument that state
laws authorizing the juvenile death penalty are invalid.1 0 0 TheJustice Department intervened in at least one such case to defend the
validity of state laws and to contest the argument that the interna93.

See STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY, supra note 77, at 4 (stating that

South Carolina executed Terry Roach in January 1986, and Texas executed Jay Pinkerton
in May 1986).
94. The Human Rights Committee is a treaty monitoring body established by the
ICCPR. See ICCPR, supra note 39, art. 28, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179.
95. See U.N. GAOR, CCPR Human Rts. Comm., Initial Reports of States Parties Due in
1993: United States of America, Doc. CCPR/C/81/Add.4 (Aug. 24, 1994), http://www.
unhchr. ch/ tbs/doc.nsf/ (Symbol) /da936c49ed8aa8f8025655c005281cf? Opendocument
(last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
96. See U.N. GAOR, CCPR Human Rts. Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee: United States of America, U.N. Doc. A/50/40 (Oct. 3, 1995), http://
www. unhchr. ch / tbs /doc. nsf/0 / b7d33f6b0f726283cl 2563f000512bdl ? Opendocument
(last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
97. See id. 279.
98. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19(c), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, 336-37.
99. U.N. GAOR, Human Rts. Comm., Summary Record of the 1405th Meeting of the
Human Rights Committee: United States of America,
13-15, Doc. CCPR/C/SR.1405 (Apr.
24, 1995) (statement of Mr. Harper), http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/0/64b96f92ce
046f74802566660059807b?Opendocument (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
100. See Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 266-67 (5th Cir. 2001); Ex ParteBurgess, 811
So.2d 617, 628-629 (Ala. 2000); Ex Parte Pressley, 770 So.2d 143, 147-50 (Ala. 2000);
Servin v. State, 32 P.3d 1277, 1285-86 (Nev. 2001); Domingues v. State, 961 P.2d 1279,
1279-80 (Nev. 1998).
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tional standard is binding on the United States.10 ' Prior to the Missouri Supreme Court's decision in Simmons,10 2 state and federal
courts had consistently upheld the authority of state governments
to execute juvenile offenders, notwithstanding international law
03
arguments to the contrary.
In sum, prior to the decision in Simmons, U.S. behavior since at
least 1977 manifested a strong, consistent policy preference for
preserving the U.S.' freedom to execute juvenile offenders.
2.

Application of Goldsmith and Posner's Theory

As noted above, the Supreme Court decision in Simmons constituted a sudden change from U.S. resistance to U.S. acceptance of
the international norm regarding the juvenile death penalty. In
terms of the models set forth in Limits, neither the cooperation nor
the coordination model applies because the United States did not
act jointly with another country. Goldsmith and Posner, however,
might attempt to explain this sudden about-face on the juvenile
death penalty either in terms of coercion or coincidence of
interest.
Coercion occurs when "[o]ne state, or a coalition of states with
convergent interests, forces other states to engage in actions that
serve the interest of the first state or states."' 0 4 In this case, a coalition of states, international organizations and other transnational
actors applied pressure on the United States for many years to alter
its behavior.10 5 Numerous states have urged the United States in
private diplomatic exchanges to halt the practice of executing juvenile offenders.10 6 An amicus brief in the Simmons case, filed by a
101. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Opposing the Grant of Certiorari, Domingues, 961 P.2d 1279 (1999) (No. 29896) (excerpts reprinted in NEWMAN ET AL.,
supra note 38, at 702-06).
102. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. 2003) (holding execution of an individual who was under eighteen at time of the crime as a violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments).
103. See Beazley, 242 F.3d at 266-67; Ex Parte Burgess, 811 So.2d at 628-629; Ex Parte
Pressley, 770 So.2d at 147-50; Servin, 32 P.3d at 1285-86; Domingues, 961 P.2d at 1279-80.
104. LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 28.
105. The participation of a number of non-state actors illustrates another weakness of
the theory set forth in Limits. Limits focuses almost exclusively on states. In the modern
world, a variety of non-state actors can potentially have a significant impact on global politics. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 6, at 2646-48 (analyzing the role of private "norm entrepreneurs" and nongovernmental organizations in the debate over reinterpretation of the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty).
106. See Brief for U.S. Diplomats et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, State ex
rel. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2004) (No. 03-633), available at 2004 WL 1636448 at *23-*24
(stating that "U.S. diplomats abroad are increasingly called into meetings to answer foreign
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group of retired U.S. diplomats, noted that the continued practice
of executing juvenile offenders "strains diplomatic relations with
close American allies [and] increases America's diplomatic isolation."'10 7 Both the UN General Assembly and the Economic and
Social Council have urged states to halt the practice of executing
juvenile offenders.1 08 In 1998 the UN Special Rapporteur for
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions issued a detailed
report that was highly critical of U.S. capital punishment practices,
especially with regard to juvenile offenders. 10 9 The UN Human
Rights Commission has adopted resolutions every year since 1997
condemning states that continue to execute juvenile offenders.'" 0
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has also condemned the U.S. practice of executing juvenile offenders. 1
In light of the above facts, Goldsmith and Posner might try to
explain Simmons in terms of their coercion model. There are three
reasons, however, why Simmons is best explained in terms of a persuasion model, not a coercion model. 1 2 First, coercion alters a
criticisms of the death penalty," and that "[a]mici can personally attest to the degree to
which important bilateral meetings with our closest allies are now consumed with responding to repeated official challenges to this practice").
107. Id. at *1.
108. See United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile
Justice, G.A. Res. 40/33, Rule 17.2, U.N. GAOR, 40th Sess., Annex, Supp. No. 53, at 207,
U.N. Doc. A/40/53 (Nov. 29, 1985); United Nations Economic and Social Council, Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of Those Facing the Death Penalty, E.S.C.
Res. 1984/50, U.N. ESCOR,
3, U.N. Doc. E/RES/1984/50 (1984).
109. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions, Mr. Bacre Waly Ndiaye, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1997/
61, Addendum: Mission to the United States of America, J 49-56 (1998), E/CN.4/1998/
68/Add.3, available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/mainec.aspx (last visited Oct. 4,
2005).
110. See, e.g., The question of the death penalty, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 61st
Sess. Res. 2005/59, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/59, 7(a) (Apr. 20, 2005) (urging states
that maintain the death penalty "[n]ot to impose it for crimes committed by persons below
18 years of age"); Question of the death penalty, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 60th
Sess. Res. 2004/67, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2004/67
4(a) (Apr. 21, 2004) (same); The
question of the death penalty, U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 59th Sess. Res. 2003/67,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/67
4(a) (Apr. 24, 2003) (same), all available at http://
ap.ohchr.org/documents/mainec.aspx.
111. See, e.g., 2002 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, OEA/Ser. L/V.II 117 Doc. 1 rev. 1, Report. No. 62/02 (Oct. 22, 2002) (Domingues,
12.285, Inter-Am. C.H.R. No. 62/02, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.117, Doc.1, rev.1 (holding that execution of juvenile offenders violates customary international law)), available at http://
www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA. 12285.htm.
112. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DuKE L.J. 621 (2004) (distinguishing among three distinct
mechanisms of social influence, which they call "coercion," "persuasion," and
"acculturation").
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state's behavior through a combination of threats and promises,
whereas persuasion alters a state's behavior through rational argumentation. 113 The key U.S. decision-maker in this case was the
United States Supreme Court. There is no evidence whatsoever
that the Supreme Court decided Simmons in response to threats or
promises. Rather, the Court was persuaded by rational argument
that the juvenile death penalty contravenes the Eighth Amend' 14
ment ban on "cruel and unusual punishments." "
Second, states that are coerced are responding to external constraints. In contrast, "[p]ersuaded actors 'internalize' new norms
and rules of appropriate behavior." 11 5 Assuming that the United
States will change its behavior in response to the Supreme Court
decision in Simmons, that behavioral modification will not be the
result of an external constraint. To the contrary, the Supreme
Court internalized the international norm when it held that the
juvenile death penalty is unconstitutional. 16
Third, a key difference between persuasion and coercion is that
persuasion alters a state's preferences, whereas coercion modifies
behavior without changing those preferences. 1 7 Since a coerced
state's preferences remain unchanged, a state that has been forced
by external threats to refrain from certain action will resume that
action once the threat is removed. 118 In this case, the external
pressure on the United States will undoubtedly cease as a result of
the Supreme Court's decision in Simmons." 9 Yet, once the external
pressure ceases, there is no reason to believe that the United States
will resume the practice of executing juvenile offenders. To the
contrary, the Supreme Court decision has effectively put an end to
113. See id. at 633-38.
114. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
115. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 112, at 635.
116. Indeed, the story of Simmons and the juvenile death penalty provides a textbook
illustration of Dean Koh's transnational legal process theory. According to Koh, "the key
to better compliance is more internalized compliance." Koh, supra note 6, at 2645-46.
Norm internalization results from a three-step process involving "interaction," "interpretation," and "internalization." Id. at 2646. That is precisely what happened with the United
States and the juvenile death penalty. Various states and non-state entities provoked a
series of interactions with the United States related to the juvenile death penalty. See supra
notes 89-99 and 104-111 and accompanying text. One such interaction between a death
row prisoner and the State of Missouri yielded an authoritative interpretation by the
Supreme Court, which internalized the norm. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183. Internalization
will lead to U.S. compliance.
117. See Goodman &Jinks, supra note 112, at 633-38.
118. This proposition is implicit in Goldsmith and Posner's coercion model. See LIMITS
OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 28-29.

119. The United States will continue to be subject to external pressure regarding the
death penalty, but not the juvenile death penalty.

HeinOnline -- 38 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 179 2006

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 38

the practice for all time. If the external pressure is removed and
the United States continues to act in accordance with the norm,
then the coercion model set forth in Limits does not apply.
Since the coercion model is inapplicable, Goldsmith and Posner
might explain U.S. behavior in terms of the coincidence of interest
model. Although they "take state interests at any particular time to
be an unexplained given," 120 they acknowledge that "various
domestic groups and institutions influence the political leadership's decisions related to international law." 1 21 Here, the U.S.
Supreme Court is a domestic institution that, by means of its decision in Simmons, has influenced the political leadership's preferences (i.e. state interests) regarding the juvenile death penalty.
Goldsmith and Posner, therefore, might argue that state interests
have changed in response to domestic legal developments. The
fact that Supreme Court decisions influence U.S. preferences
related to international law is consistent with the theory in Limits,
provided that Supreme Court decisions are not influenced by international law. On the other hand, if international law influences
the Supreme Court, and state interests change in response to
Supreme Court decisions, then international law shapes state interests. While Limits emphatically denies that international law shapes
state interests, 122 that is precisely what happened in Simmons.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Simmons offers three separate arguments in support of the Court's holding that the juvenile
death penalty is unconstitutional. First, the majority contends that
123
there is a national consensus against the juvenile death penalty.
Second, the majority cites a variety of psychological and sociological evidence to show "that juvenile offenders cannot with reliability
be classified among the worst offenders."'12 4 Third, the majority
reviews international law and practice to demonstrate "that the
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give
official sanction to the juvenile death penalty."1 2 5 International law
thus features prominently in the majority opinion.
120.

LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 9.

121. Id. at 6.
122. See id. at 9 ("Constructivists ... seek to show that the preferences of individuals,
and therefore state interests, can be influenced by international law and institutions. To
the extent this is true, it would call into question our theory's ability to explain international law in terms of state interests. We doubt it is true to any important degree.")
123. Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1192-94 (2005).
124. Id. at 1194-98.
125. Id. at 1198-1200.
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Granted, the majority is careful to state that "the opinion of the
126
world community" does not control the outcome in Simmons.
Despite this obligatory statement, however, there are grounds to
believe that international law and practice may have been the decisive factor that tipped the scales against the juvenile death penalty.
Just sixteen years before Simmons, the Court held in Stanford v. Kentucky (Stanford) that the Constitution does not prohibit the execution of juvenile offenders who were sixteen or seventeen years of
age when they committed their crimes. 12 7 At least two of the five
justices comprising the majority in Simmons have previously
endorsed the view that constitutional precedent is entitled to great
weight, and should be overruled only in rare cases. 128 And, as the
dissent points out, the evidence of a national consensus in Simmons
was not substantially stronger than it had been in 1989 when the
Court decided Stanford.129 Moreover, scientific knowledge about
the social and psychological development of teenagers has not
changed appreciably since 1989.130 In contrast, between 1989 and
2005, almost one hundred states assumed an international treaty
obligation prohibiting the juvenile death penalty.' 31 Thus, of the
three main prongs of the Court's analysis, international law is the
only one that has changed dramatically since the Court decided
126. Id. at 1200.
127. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
128. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (stating that "the very
concept of the rule of law underlying our own Constitution requires such continuity over
time that a respect for precedent is, by definition, indispensable") (joint opinion ofJustices
O'Connor, Kennedy and Souter). Justices Souter and Kennedy both joined the majority
opinion in Simmons.
129. See Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1210-12 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id. at 1218-21
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. Indeed, the evidence cited by the majority in Simmons is quite similar to the evidence cited by the majority in Thompson, where the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars execution ofjuvenile offenders who were less than sixteen years old at the time
of the crime. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 834-38 (1988).
131. As of December 1989, there were ninety states parties to the ICCPR. See Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as at 31 December 1989, 134,
U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/8 (1990). All ninety states, as parties to the ICCPR, had
assumed a treaty obligation prohibiting the juvenile death penalty. See ICCPR, supra note
39, art. 6, 15. As of December 1989, there were twenty-one states parties to the ACHR. See
AMERICAN CONVENTION ON HU'MAN RIGHTS, SIGNATURES AND CURRENT STATUS OF RATIFICA-

(n.d.), at http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/basic4.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2005). All
twenty-one states, as parties to the ACHR, had assumed a treaty obligation prohibiting the
juvenile death penalty. See ACHR, supra note 42, art. 4, 5. Sixteen of the states who were
parties to the ACHR in December 1989 were also parties to the ICCPR at that time. Thus,
as of December 1989, ninety-five states had assumed a treaty obligation prohibiting the
juvenile death penalty. At present, 193 states have undertaken such a treaty obligation. See
supra note 39.
TIONS
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Stanford. Therefore, the international law argument is the only one
that justifies overruling a constitutional precedent.
Suppose, though, one accepts at face value the majority's assertion that international law did not "control" the outcome in Simmons. 13 2 Even so, it is beyond dispute that international law
influenced the outcome. As noted above, the majority opinion
advances three separate rationales supporting its conclusion; international law and practice comprise the core of one of those rationales. The majority opinion cites four different amicus briefs that
focus almost exclusively on international law and practice. 133 In his
dissent, Justice Scalia observes that "the views of other countries
and the so-called international community take center stage" in the
13 4
majority's analysis.
In sum, there is no doubt that international law and practice had
a significant influence on the Court's decision in Simmons, even if
they did not "control" the outcome. Moreover, there is no doubt
that the United States will modify its behavior-both domestically
and internationally-as a result of the Court's decision. The case
study of the United States and the juvenile death penalty, therefore, belies one of the central claims advanced in Limits. Whereas
Limits contends that international law does not influence state
behavior to any significant degree,1 3 5 this case study demonstrates
that international law was a crucial factor that caused the United
States to reverse its foreign policy posture from resistance to
acceptance of the international norm regarding the juvenile death
penalty. Realists, however, may downplay the significance of this
example because there were no vital national security interests at
stake. Accordingly, the next case study addresses a situation that
has a direct bearing on national security.
IV.

CHINA AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

The nuclear nonproliferation regime comprises a set of formal
treaties, informal agreements, official international organizations
132. See Simmons, 125 S. Ct. at 1198 (stating that the practice of other states is not
"controlling"); id. at 1200 ("[t]he opinion of the world community [is] not controlling").
133. See id. at 1199 (citing amicus briefs filed by the European Union, President Carter
and other nobel peace prize winners, former U.S. diplomats, and the human rights committee of the Bar of England and Wales, all presenting arguments based on international
law and practice).
134. Id. at 1225 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
135. See LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 8-9 (stating that authors
"doubt" the assumption that state interests can be influenced by international law and
institutions).
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and unofficial "supplier clubs," all of which share the goal of curbing the spread of nuclear weapons to additional states. 13 6 Prior to
1984 China was openly hostile to the main objective of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime; it actively promoted nuclear proliferation
in both word and deed.1 37 Over the past two decades, though,
China's posture has undergone a gradual transformation. In 1984
China changed its declaratory policy: Premier Zhao Ziyang stated
that China "by no means favored nuclear proliferation, nor would
China engage in such proliferation by helping other countries to
develop nuclear weapons.' 3
In 1992 China acceded to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).139 Between 1997 and
2004, China joined the two main nuclear "supplier "clubs" and
internalized their export control guidelines in its domestic export
control regulations. Thus, over the course of two decades, China
went from being a rogue state that actively encouraged proliferation to a responsible supplier whose nuclear export activities
40
largely conform to international norms.'
Part Three is divided into four sections. The first section
describes the development of the nuclear nonproliferation regime,
with an emphasis on nuclear export controls. The next three sections trace the evolution of China's nuclear export control policies
and practices in three stages. Stage one covers the period from
signature of the NPT in 1968 until the mid-1980s. Stage two
addresses the mid-1980s through the mid-1990s. Stage three covers
the mid-1990s to the present. Limits' models of cooperation and
coordination can explain much of the evolution of the nuclear
nonproliferation regime. Similarly, Limits' rational choice theory
136. See David S. Gualtieri et al., Advancing the Law of Weapons Control-Comparative
Approaches to Strengthen Nuclear Non-Proliferation,16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1029, 1039-45 (1995)
(providing an overview of the nuclear nonproliferation regime).
137. See infra notes 178-187 and accompanying text.
138. Qingshan Tan, U.S.-China Nuclear CooperationAgreement: China'sNonproliferationPolicy, 29 ASIAN SuRVEY, 870, 879 (1989) (quoting statement made by Chinese Premier Zhao
Ziyang to the U.S. Senate in 1984).
139. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483,
729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force March 5, 1970) [hereinafter NPT].
140. This statement requires two caveats. First, although China's recent nuclear export
practices are generally consistent with international norms, that is not true for China's
missile-related exports. See China's ProliferationPractices and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis:
Hearing Before the U.S.-China Econ. and Sec. Review Comm'n, 108th Cong. 7-18 (2003) (statement of Paula A. DeSutter, Assistant Secretary of State for Verification and Compliance,
Department of State) [hereinafter DeSutter Testimony] (providing a brief overview of the
history of U.S. nonproliferation discussions with China), available at www.state.gov/t/vc/
rls/rm/24518.htm (visited July 1, 2005). Second, although China's laws and regulations
governing nuclear exports generally conform to international standards, there are still
some minor implementation problems. See infra notes 268-271 and accompanying text.
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accounts reasonably well for China's willful non-compliance with
international norms during stage one. China's subsequent noncompliance, however, is best explained by a bureaucratic politics
model, not a rational choice model. Moreover, Goldsmith and
Posner's theory cannot adequately explain China's gradual transformation from rogue state to responsible supplier over the past
two decades.
A.

The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime

In the 1950s and early 1960s, states with developed nuclear technology often transferred that technology to other states without
requiring International Atomic Energy Agency (LAEA) safeguards
as a condition of supply.' 4 ' For example, France provided Israel
with a nuclear research reactor that Israel later used to produce
1 42
unsafeguarded plutonium for its nuclear weapons program.
Canada also supplied India with an unsafeguarded nuclear
research reactor that produced the plutonium for India's first
nuclear test. 143 In the early 1960s the United States became
increasingly concerned about the prospect of widespread nuclear
proliferation. A classified assessment prepared by the Pentagon in
1963 "listed over ten countries that could acquire nuclear weapons
... in less than a decade." 144 Both the United Kingdom and the
Soviet Union shared U.S. fears about the dangers of nuclear
proliferation. 4 5 These fears gave impetus to negotiation of the
NPT, which was signed in 1968, and entered into force in 1970.146
1.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The NPT divides states into two groups: nuclear-weapon states
(NWS) and non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS). The NPT obligates NWS "not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear
141. The LAEA is an international organization created by the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, 276 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into
force July 29, 1957). Under the Statute, the Agency is empowered to conduct inspections
and maintain an accounting of nuclear material in member states to help ensure that such
material is used only for peaceful purposes. See id. art. XII, 8 U.S.T. at 1105-08 (explaining
the rights and responsibilities of the Agency). The Agency's accounting and inspection
system is referred to as "IAEA safeguards."
142. See ISRAEL: NUCLEAR WAEAPONS (n.d.), at http://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/
index.html (last visited July 9, 2005).
143. See LEONARD S. SPECTOR, THE NEW NUCLEAR NATIONS 99-100 (1985).

144.

GEORGE BUNN, ARMs CONTROL BY COMMrrrEE: MANAGING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE

RussIANS 67 (1992).

145.
146.

See id. at 66-72.
See id. at 59-105 (providing detailed history of treaty negotiations).
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weapons or other nuclear explosive devices," and not "to assist,
encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."1 4 7 NWS are also obligated "to pursue negotiations in
good faith on effective measures relating to . . . nuclear disarmament."1 48 NNWS are obligated "not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."' 49
To help verify compliance with these primary obligations, NNWS
agree to accept IAEA safeguards on nuclear material for the purpose of "preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses
to nuclear weapons. "150
According to Limits, the primary reason why states enter into
treaties "is that they gain more than they lose, on balance, from the
agreement."1 5 1 This statement succinctly describes the incentives
of almost all the original parties to the NPT. There were fortythree original parties to the NPT, including three nuclear-weapon
states and forty non-nuclear weapon states. 52 The three NWS15 3
the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom
all wanted to limit the acquisition of nuclear weapons by additional states.' 54 Thus, the Article I restriction that prohibited them
from transferring nuclear weapons to other states served their
interests. Moreover, they presumably calculated that the Article VI
obligation "to pursue negotiations in good faith" on nuclear disarmament was a price they were willing to pay in order to get the
benefit of treaty limitations on acquisition of nuclear weapons by
NNWS.
The vast majority of the NNWS that were original parties to the
NPT had no realistic prospect of acquiring nuclear weapons. As
147. NPT, supra note 139, art. I. The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as "one
which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device
prior to January 1, 1967." Id. art. IX, 1 3. Under this definition, the United States, the
United Kingdom, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), France and China are nuclearweapon states. All other states are non-nuclear-weapon states.
148. Id. art. VI.
149. Id. art. II.
150. Id. art. III, 1 1.
151. LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 89.
152. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A GLOBAL SUCCESS (2001), www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/2001/3055.htm
(last visited June 27, 2005).
153. France and China, the other two nuclear-weapon states, did not join the NPT
until 1992. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY (NPT):
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND CHALLENGES (2001), www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/2001/5485.htm
(last visited June 27, 2005).
154. See BUNN, supra note 144, at 72-80.
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Goldsmith and Posner wryly note, "[w]hen Burkina Faso, Costa
Rica, Gabon, the Holy See, and Malta ratified the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, they did not have to alter their pre-ratification
behaviors.' 1 55 The same applies to the majority of NNWS who were
original parties to the NPT. Their decision to ratify can thus be
explained by Goldsmith and Posner's "coincidence of interest"
model: the treaty prohibited the states from engaging in activity
that they had no interest or capacity to pursue.
However, Goldsmith and Posner's theory seems inadequate to
explain the ratification decisions of all the original NPT NNWS.
For example, Sweden maintained an active nuclear weapons program in the 1950s and most of the 1960s, which it did not finally
terminate until 1972.156 In 1963 a classified Pentagon document
ranked Sweden as one of the United States' top proliferation concerns, estimating that Sweden would be able to conduct a nuclear
test within two to three years. 157 Goldsmith and Posner contend
that states do not ratify treaties unless "they gain more than they
lose, on balance, from the agreement." 158 Yet Sweden clearly
incurred a cost by ratifying the NPT: it was forced to dismantle its
nuclear weapons program. 159 Granted, Sweden did not have a
huge incentive to develop nuclear weapons because it did not confront any serious external nuclear threat. On the other hand,
though, ratification of the NPT did not provide Sweden any offsetting security benefit. 160 Thus, if one focuses narrowly on security
interests, Sweden's ratification decision presents a puzzle for Goldsmith and Posner's theory because ratification appears to impose a
cost with no offsetting benefit.
155. Limits of International Law, supra note 7, at 89.
156. Richard L. Williamson, Jr., Law and the H-Bomb: Strengthening the Nonproliferation
Regime to Impede Advanced Proliferation,28 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 71, 122 n.207 (1995).
157. BUNN, supra note 144 at 67-68.
158. LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 89.
159. It is not entirely clear why Sweden pursued a nuclear weapons program in the first
place. If it wanted the geopolitical power that often accompanies a nuclear weapons program, the cost of dismantling the program was non-trivial. According to one estimate, if
Sweden had decided to proceed with its nuclear weapons program, as of the mid-1990s it
might have had a nuclear stockpile comparable to China's. Williamson, supra note 156, at
122, n.207. A nuclear force of that magnitude would presumably have given Sweden substantial geopolitical power.
160. One might argue that Sweden derived a security benefit insofar as the NPT
restricted the spread of nuclear weapons to other countries. Assuming, though, that Sweden wanted to restrict the spread of nuclear weapons, there is no reason to think that
Sweden's ratification decision had a significant influence on the ratification decision of any
other state.
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In this author's view, the best explanation for Sweden's ratification decision is that law often serves an expressive function. Sweden ratified the NPT primarily to express its support for the
emerging non-proliferation norm. Goldsmith and Posner acknowledge that the "rhetoric" of international law is an important aspect
of the international legal system, 161 but they insist that the rhetoric
of international law is entirely self-serving.' 62 The Swedish example, however, suggests that international rhetoric is not always selfserving. States sometimes undertake legal obligations for the purpose of expressing their support for an international norm, even
when that obligation imposes a cost without any offsetting benefit,
other than the moral satisfaction of expressing one's support for a
normatively appealing position. Goldsmith and Posner's theory
163
fails to account for this type of behavior.
2.

Nuclear Export Controls

The NPT creates two different types of obligations with respect
to nuclear exports. The first obligation applies only to NWS.
Under Article I, they agree not to transfer nuclear explosives or to
help any NNWS acquire nuclear explosives. 16 4 The second obligation applies to all NPT parties. Under Article III, both NWS and
NNWS are obligated "not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed orprepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable
material, to any non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes,
unless the source or special fissionable material" is subject to IAEA
165
safeguards.
At the time the NPT entered into force, there was no common
understanding about what constituted "EDP" equipment-that is,
equipment or material "especially designed or prepared" for pro161. See generally LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 167-84 (presenting a
theory of international rhetoric).
162. Id. at 168-70.
163. In the final chapter of their book, Goldsmith and Posner present an argument
against what they call "strong state cosmopolitanism." Id. at 205. They tacitly concede,
though, that states sometimes engage in weak cosmopolitan action. Therefore, the authors
might argue that Sweden's ratification of the NPT is an example of weak cosmopolitan
action. Regardless of whether one characterizes the ratification decision as "weak" or
"strong" cosmopolitanism, though, it is difficult to explain Sweden's ratification decision in
terms of Goldsmith and Posner's models of coincidence of interest, coercion, cooperation
and coordination, because all four models assume that states are motivated by self-interest,
rather than a sense of cosmopolitan duty.
164. NPT, supra note 139, art. I.
2 (emphasis added).
165. Id. art. III,
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duction and processing of nuclear materials. Beginning in 1971,
representatives from fifteen states held a series of discussions to
reach agreement on a list of EDP equipment and materials. 166 The
group came to be known as the "Zangger Committee," named after
its Swiss chairman Claude Zangger. The list they developed is
referred to as a "trigger list" because the export of listed items triggers the NPT requirement for LAEA safeguards. The Zangger
Committee trigger list was initially published in 1974.167
In addition to the Zangger Committee, there is another nuclear
export body known as the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The
NSG was formed following India's detonation of a nuclear explosive device in 1974, "which demonstrated that nuclear technology
transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused." 168 The NSG
produced its own trigger list, first published in 1978.169 The original NSG trigger list was quite similar to the original Zangger list.
The original Zangger list, however, covered only "equipment and
materials," as specified in NPT Article 111.170 In contrast, the original NSG list was somewhat broader because it included controls on
"equipment, materials, and technology." 17 ' Additionally, the NSG list
included a set of "guidelines for nuclear transfers" that was more
detailed and more restrictive than the supply conditions in the
original Zangger list.1 72
Neither the Zangger Committee nor the NSG codified its trigger
list in a formal treaty. Rather, the "agreements" amounted to a set
166.

DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF NONPROLIFERATION, FACT SHEET ON THE ZANGGER COM-

MIYTEE (2004), http://www.state.gov/t/np/rls/fs/34766.htm (last visited July 9, 2005).

167. International Atomic Energy Agency, Communications Received from Members Regarding the Export of NuclearMaterialand of Certain Categoriesof Equipment and Other Material,Doc.
INFCIRC/209 (Sept. 3, 1974) [hereinafter INFCIRC/209] (original Zangger Committee
trigger list).
168. International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication of 10 May 2005 received from
the Government of Sweden on behalf of the participatingGovernments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
Doc. INFCIRC/539/Rev.3, at *5 (May 30, 2005) [hereinafter NSG Origins], http://
(last visited Oct.
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc539r3.pdf
20, 2005). There is substantial overlap between the membership of the two organizations.
Unlike the Zangger Committee, however, the original NSG membership included France,
which was not then an NPT party.
169. International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Received From Certain Member
States Regarding Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear Materials, Equipment or Technology,
INFCIRC/254 (Feb. 1978) [hereinafter INFCIRC/254] (original NSG trigger list), available
at www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc254.shtml (visitedJuly 9,
2005).
170. See INFCIRC/209, supra note 167.
171. See INFCIRC/254, supra note 169.
172. Compare INFCIRC/209, supra note 167, with INFCIRC/254, supra note 169
(emphasis added).
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of parallel "unilateral declarations that the Understandings would
be given effect through respective domestic export control legislation." 17 3 Both trigger lists have been updated and expanded several times since the 1970s. Additionally, both groups have
expanded their membership substantially.
In 1992 the NSG made two major policy decisions to strengthen
its nuclear export controls. First, NSG members agreed "I t] o make
a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA a condition for
the future supply of Trigger List items to any non-nuclear-weapon
State." 174 The prior guidelines required safeguards for all exports
of trigger list items, but permitted NSG members to export safeguarded uranium, for example, to a state that also operated
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The full-scope safeguards policy
codified an agreement by NSG members to refrain from exporting
any trigger list items to states, such as Pakistan, that maintained
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. The Zangger Committee has
never adopted a full-scope safeguards policy.
The second major policy decision was to develop "guidelines for
transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, material and technology (items which have both nuclear and non-nuclear applications) that could make a significant contribution to an
75
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activity."'
Whereas the original trigger list focused on EDP items, the new
dual-use controls were specifically intended to cover equipment,
materials, and technology that were not "especially designed or
prepared" for production or processing of nuclear materials.
When the NSG adopted the dual-use guidelines, the original trigger list became "Part 1" of the NSG Guidelines and the dual-use
guidelines became "Part 2." The Zangger guidelines do not
address dual-use items because they are outside the scope of NPT
Article III.
In sum, the Zangger and NSG trigger lists both provide a list of
EDP items and require safeguards on exports of EDP items, as stipulated in NPT Article III. In that respect, both trigger lists are textbook examples of Limits' coordination model. 176 The NSG goes
beyond NPT requirements by controlling dual-use items and
173. ZANGGER COMMIrrEE, HISTORy (n.d.), at http://www.zanggercommittee.org/
Zangger/History/default.htm (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
174. NSG Origins, supra note 168, 15.
175. Id.
176. See LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 85 ("In coordination games,
when the agreement sets out what the coordinating action is, it becomes less likely that a
failure of coordination will occur because of error."). The trigger lists "set out what the
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requiring full-scope safeguards for exports of EDP items. These
additional requirements exemplify Limits' cooperation model. In
the absence of an agreement on dual-use exports, economic incentives would drive supplier states to continue selling dual-use items
to nuclear proliferant states, thereby contributing to nuclear weap177
ons programs in those states and making everyone worse off.
The agreement on dual-use exports solves this prisoner's dilemma.
B.

China's NonproliferationPolicies and Practices: 1968 to 1983

Recall that the NPT was signed in 1968. For the next fifteen
years, China regularly "condemned the NPT because it bestowed a
nuclear monopoly on the five declared nuclear weapons states and
relegated other nations to permanent non-nuclear weapons status."'17 8 Indeed, "China repudiated such discrimination as a vestige
79
of colonialism and advocated the overthrow of the NPT regime."1
During this period, China was not a party to the NPT, nor was it a
member of the IAEA, the Zangger Committee or the NSG.
China's nuclear export practices were consistent with its declaratory policies. For example, "China is believed to have sold
unsafeguarded enriched uranium to such countries as South Africa
and Argentina" in the early 1980s.18 0 At the time, neither South
Africa nor Argentina was an NPT party, and both were engaged in
nuclear activities that were not subject to IAEA safeguards. Any
sale of enriched uranium in the absence of IAEA safeguards would
be a direct contravention of NPT Article III, which requires IAEA
safeguards for all exports of "source or special fissionable material"
18
to a non-nuclear-weapon state. '
During this period, China also supplied the bulk of the 250 metric tons of "heavy water" that India received in order to operate its
unsafeguarded nuclear reactors.1 8 2 Heavy water was included in
coordinating action is" by listing EDP items, thereby making a failure of coordination less
likely.
177. This is basically what happened in Iraq in the 1980s prior to Desert Storm and
prior to agreement on the dual-use guidelines. See Barry Kellman, Bridling the International
Trade of CatastrophicWeaponry, 43 AM. U. L. REv. 755, 787-89 (1994) (discussing exports to
Iraq in the late 1980s).
178. Zachary S. Davis, China's Nonproliferationand Export Control Policies: Boom or Bustfor
the NPT Regime?, 35 ASIAN SuRVEy 587, 588 (1995).
179. Id.
180.

LEONARD S. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR AMBITIONS: THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

1989-1990, at 403 (1990). See also Kellman, supra note 177, at 783 (discussing Chinese
exports of enriched uranium to Argentina and South Africa).
181. NPT, supra note 139, Art. III,
2.
182.

SPECTOR, NUCLEAR AMBITIONS, supra note 180, at 36-37.
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the original Zangger and NSG trigger lists because it is "especially
8 3
designed or prepared" for the production of nuclear material.
China provided heavy water to India through a West German broker.1 4 Chinese authorities may not have known that the material
was destined for India, but they did not bother "to verify the ultimate destination of the heavy water exports, nor was the requirement for safeguards applied." 18 5 The export of heavy water
without any requirement for IAEA safeguards contravened NPT
Article III.
The nuclear exports that caused greatest concern during this
period, though, were China's exports to Pakistan. According to
one commentator, China "provided essential weapons-related
nuclear aid directly to Pakistan, including the design of the nuclear
device detonated in China's fourth nuclear test ... and-according to stories in the British press-quantities of weapons-usable
highly enriched uranium sufficient for Pakistan to build two
nuclear devices." 18 6 If these reports are true, Chinese assistance to
Pakistan would be a direct contravention of Article I of the NPT,
which obligates nuclear weapon states not "to assist, encourage, or
induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise
8 7
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices."'
Since China was not an NPT party at the time, it could not be
accused of violating any treaty obligation. Its aid to Pakistan, however, manifested contempt for the key norm that is the foundation
of the nuclear non-proliferation regime.
Goldsmith and Posner's rational choice theory well explains
China's behavior during this period. China presumably calculated
that the costs of the NPT outweighed the benefits. Accordingly,
China made no effort to conform its conduct to the requirements
of the NPT.

183. INFCIRC/209, supra note 167; INFCIRC/254, supra note 169. "Heavy water" contains significantly more deuterium than ordinary water. Heavy water is used as a "moderator" in certain nuclear reactor designs. Nuclear reactors that use heavy water as a
moderator are typically fueled with natural uranium. In contrast, reactors that use ordinary water as a moderator require enriched uranium fuel. Enriched uranium is more
expensive and harder to obtain than natural uranium.
184.

185.
186.
tance to
187.

SPECTOR, NUCLEAR AmBITIONS, supra note 180, at 36-37.

Id.
Id. at 42-43. See also Kellman, supra note 177, at 782 (describing Chinese assis9

Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the early 1 80s).

NPT, supra note 139, art. I.
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China's NonproliferationPolicies and Practices: 1984 to 1995

Whereas China was openly hostile to nuclear nonproliferation
norms before 1984, China abandoned its hostility over the next ten
years and gradually embraced the nuclear nonproliferation
regime. In the period before 1984, China's exports manifested
willful disregard for nuclear export control rules. In contrast, from
the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s, China's nuclear exports contravened international norms only intermittently, and to some extent
inadvertently.
1. Positive Developments
China's nuclear non-proliferation policies began to change in
1984. First, China became a member of the IAEA in 1984.188 Additionally, Chinese leaders made several public statements that
expressed a significant change in declaratory policy. During a visit
to the United States in January 1984, Premier Zhao Ziyang said that
"China does not engage in nuclear proliferation ourselves, nor do
we help other countries to develop nuclear weapons."' 89 Later that
year, the Sixth National People's Congress endorsed this policy. 190
Then in January 1985, Vice Premier Li Peng stated that "China has
no intention, either at the present or in the future, to help nonnuclear countries develop nuclear weapons."' 19 Several years later,
in August 1991, China announced its decision "in principle" to join
the NPT. China ultimately became a party to the NPT on March 9,
1992.192
Goldsmith and Posner might explain the change in China's
declaratory policy in 1984 and 1985 in terms of their coercion
model. In 1981 the United States and China began discussions
about the possibility of concluding a nuclear cooperation agreement. 19 3 China wanted an agreement with the United States
because China was seeking foreign assistance to develop its nuclear
power industry. 194 One of the U.S.' key goals in the negotiation
was to use the "carrot" of future nuclear cooperation to secure
China's commitment to nonproliferation norms.1 95 Key statements
188. Davis, supra note 178, at 589.
189. Tan, supra note 138, at 879 (quoting Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang).
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting Vice Premier Li Peng).
192. Davis, supra note 178, at 592.
193. Tan, supra note 138, at 875.
194. See id. at 870-72 (discussing China's interest in using foreign equipment and services for most of its nuclear projects).
195. Id. at 873.
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indicating China's changed declaratory policy were made in the
context of negotiations over the nuclear cooperation agreement. 96
One could thus argue that China's new declaratory policy was
merely a quid pro quo for the U.S. decision to enter into a nuclear
cooperation agreement.
This explanation is accurate, but incomplete, because it ignores
the domestic political changes that preceded China's efforts to
seek foreign assistance for its nuclear power industry. Throughout
the 1960s and most of the 1970s, China's economy was largely
closed to foreign investment. In the late 1970s, China began an
economic modernization drive that led to increased interaction
with the global economy. 19 7 One empirical study has shown that
"ruling coalitions pursuing economic liberalization" are more
likely to conform to nonproliferation norms "than their inwardlooking, nationalist . . . counterparts."1 98 If China had not been
pursuing economic liberalization, the U.S.' "carrot" of nuclear
cooperation would probably not have induced China to change its
nuclear policies. Thus, the domestic political decision to pursue
market-oriented reforms was arguably a key underlying factor contributing to China's willingness to accept nonproliferation norms.
Whereas domestic politics and U.S. pressure were the key factors
leading to a change in China's declaratory policy in the mid-1980s,
China's decision to join the NPT was largely the result of acculturation. "Acculturation" refers to "the general process of adopting the
beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding culture ...
Acculturation induces behavioral changes . . . by changing the
actor's social environment."' 99 In 1991 two key changes in China's
"social environment" prompted its decision to join the NPT. First,
revelations about Iraq's clandestine nuclear program generated
renewed concerns about the dangers associated with nuclear
proliferation. 20 0 Second, President Mitterand's June 1991
196. See id. at 876-77 (discussing how China redefined its position on the international
nonproliferation regime).
197.

See CIA, THE WORLD FAcTBOOK -

CHINA, http://www.odci.gov/cia/publications/

factbook/print/ch.html (last updated Oct. 4, 2005).
198. Etel Solingen, The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint, 19 IN-r'L SECURITY, Fall
1994. Professor Solingen's analysis focuses on decisions by potential nuclear proliferant
states whether to acquire nuclear weapons. The general observation, however, applies also
to decisions by potential suppliers whether to conform to nuclear export norms. The
more that a state's national economy is integrated into the global economy, the greater
incentive it has to conform its conduct to global norms of international trade, including
nuclear trade.
199. Goodman &Jinks, supra note 112, at 638.
200. See Davis, supra note 178, at 591.
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announcement that France would join the NPT left China isolated
as the only nuclear weapon state holdout. 20 1 At that point, the
"normative pull" of the NPT was irresistible. In August 1991, just
two months after France's announcement, Li Peng announced
20 2
China's decision "in principal" to join the NPT.
Goldsmith and Posner deny that states respond to the "normative pull" of international law. 203 Accordingly, they might argue
that Chinajoined the NPT because it feared a reputational loss if it
refused to join. 20 4 While the claim that China's action was motivated by a fear of reputational loss seems right, it begs the question: Why did China's fear of reputational loss suddenly increase in
the summer of 1991? The only plausible answer is that reputation
is a function of the surrounding social environment, and changes
in the surrounding social environment affect the reputational loss
associated with a particular course of action. As a norm becomes
more widely accepted by the international community, a state's
continued refusal to accept the norm exacts mounting reputational costs. By the summer of 1991, the nuclear nonproliferation
norm was so entrenched that China could no longer tolerate the
reputational cost of refusing to join the NPT. 20 5 This, however, is
just another way of saying that China reacted to the "normative
pull" of the NPT. Thus, although Goldsmith and Posner deny that
states respond to the normative pull of international law, the argument that China joined the NPT to avoid reputational costs uses
the rhetoric of "reputation" to describe the processes of "acculturation" and "normative pull."
2.

Ongoing Problems

During the period from 1984 to 1995, China's export control
practices did not fully conform to its declaratory policies. For
example, China did not terminate its exports of unsafeguarded
heavy water to India until 1987.206 As noted above, both the Zangger and NSG trigger lists required safeguards on exports of heavy
201.
202.

See id. at 591-92.
Id. at 592.

203.

See LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 14-15.

204. According to Limits, the fact that some state action is motivated by a fear of reputational loss is entirely consistent with the book's rational choice theory. See id. at 100-04.
205. The number of NPT parties grew steadily from 43 original parties in March 1970,
to 65 parties by the end of 1970, to 113 parties in 1980, to 140 parties in 1990. See U.S.
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS:
TEXTS AND HISTORIES OF NEGOTIATION 103-06 (1990).
206. See SPECTOR, NUCLEAR AMBITIONS, Supra note 180, at 36-37.
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water.20 7 In the late 1980s, China was reportedly "assisting Iraq to
manufacture special magnets for a uranium enrichment plant
essential to that country's apparent bid for nuclear arms." 20 8 The
nature of this assistance is unclear. The magnets themselves would
be included under both the Zangger and NSG trigger lists as equipment "especially designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium." 20 9 If China merely provided technological
assistance, and did not supply the magnets, safeguards would be
required under paragraph 5 of the NSG guidelines, 210 but the
2 11
transfer of technology would not be covered by Zangger.
Even after China joined the NPT in 1992, its nuclear exports to
Iran and Pakistan continued to raise concerns. As an NPT party,
Iran has made a commitment to subject all of its nuclear activities
to IAEA safeguards.2 1 2 Even so, there have long been suspicions
that Iran was trying to acquire nuclear weapons, in violation of its
NPT obligations.2 1 3 In or around 1995, PRC technicians built an
electromagnetic isotope separation (EMIS) unit in Iran, otherwise
known as a "calutron."21 4 The calutron was apparently "similar to
the one used in Iraq's secret uranium enrichment program." 2 15
China probably did not violate its NPT obligations by supplying the
2 16
EMIS unit to Iran, but that is a debatable question.
207. See supra note 183.
208. SPECTOR, NUCLEAR AMBITIONS, supra note 180, at 43.
209. INFCIRC/209, supra note 167, Memorandum B, item 2.5.1; INFCIRC/254, supra
note 169, Annex A, item 2.5.1.
210. INFCIRC/254, supra note 169, Appendix, 1 5.
211. See supra notes 170-171 and accompanying text (explaining that the NSG is
broader than the Zangger list because, inter alia, it encompasses technology).
212. NPT, supra note 139, art. III, 1 1.
213. See, e.g., ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, IRAN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A WORKING DRAFT
(2000), http://www.csis.org/mideast/reports/irannuclear02072000.pdf (last visited Oct.
18, 2005). See also CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT TO CONGRESS ON
THE ACQUISITION

OF TECHNOLOGY

RELATING

TO WEAPONS

OF

MASS

DESTRUCTION AND

2 (2003) [hereinafter CIA REPORT], http://www.cia.
gov/cia/reports/721_-reports/pdfs/jan jun2003.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
214. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CHINA AND PROLIFERAADVANCED CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS

TION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND MISSILES: POLICY ISSUES 8 (2004)

CRS REPORT], http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL3555.pdf

[hereinafter

(last visited Oct. 18, 2005).

215. Id.
216. Whether China violated its NPT obligations depends upon two subsidiary issues.
First, if a state supplies EDP equipment to a NNWS party to the NPT, and the recipient
state fails to declare the equipment to the IAEA, as Iran was obligated to do under its
safeguards agreement with the IAEA, is the exporting state legally responsible for the
recipient state's safeguards violation? Second, it is unclear whether the EMIS unit was
considered EDP equipment, within the meaning of NPT Article Ill, at the time the export
occurred. EMIS technology was not added to the Zangger trigger list until 2000. See International Atomic Energy Agency, Communications of 15 November 1999 Received From Member
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China "was suspected in 1994 of helping Pakistan to build an
unsafeguarded, plutonium-producing reactor at Khushab." 2 17 Public sources do not reveal the nature of the assistance provided.
Accordingly, it is unclear whether the alleged assistance violated
China's NPT obligations. It is clear, however, that at least one
export to Pakistan during this period did violate China's NPT obligations. According to a U.S. State Department report, "between
late 1994 and mid-1995, a Chinese entity transferred a large number of ring magnets to Pakistan for use in its uranium enrichment
program."218 The export of ring magnets violated China's NPT
obligation not to supply EDP equipment for use in unsafeguarded
nuclear activities.2 1 9 Even so, the Clinton Administration did not
impose sanctions on China because "PRC leaders insisted they
were not aware of the magnet transfer" and "there was no evidence
that the PRC government had willfully aided or abetted Pakistan's
220
nuclear weapon program through the magnet transfer."
States Regardingthe Export of Nuclear Materialand of Certain Categories of Equipment and Other
Material INFCIRC/209/Rev.2 (Mar. 9 2000), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2000/infcirc209r2.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). EMIS technology was
added to the NSG trigger list in 1995. See International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelinesfor the Export of Nuclear Material,
Equipment and Technology, Doc. INFCIRC/254/Rev.2/Part 1 (Oct. 1995), http://www.iaea.
org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf254r2pl .shtml (last visited Oct. 18,
2005). The Chinese technicians who supplied the unit to Iran presumably knew that the
unit was "especially designed or prepared" for the processing of nuclear material. But
EMIS units were omitted from early versions of the Zangger and NSG trigger lists because
EMIS was thought to be such a primitive uranium enrichment technology that it was not
worth controlling.
217.

CRS Report, supra note 214, at 4.

218. Id. at 3 (quoting State Department report on nonproliferation).
219. Ring magnets are key components of the centrifuges used in gas centrifuge uranium enrichment plants. The original Zangger and NSG trigger lists did not specifically
mention ring magnets. The Zangger list referred generally to equipment "especially
designed or prepared for the separation of isotopes of uranium." INFCIRC/209, supra
note 167, Memorandum B,
2.5.1. The NSG list was slightly more specific, referring to
gas centrifuge assemblies, corrosion-resistant to UF6." INFCIRC/254, supra note 169,
Annex A, Part B, Sec. 2b. The Zangger and NSG lists were upgraded in 1990 and 1992,
respectively. The upgraded lists both refer to "magnetic suspension bearings" for gas centrifuge assemblies, and provide technical specifications for ring-shaped magnets. See International Atomic Energy Agency, Communications Receivedfrom Members Regarding the Export of
Nuclear Materialand of Certain Categoriesof Equipment and other Material,Doc. INFCIRC/209/
Rev.1, Annex, item 5.1.2(a) (Nov. 1990), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Infcircs/Others/inf209rl.shtml (last visited September 2, 2005); International Atomic
Energy Agency, Communication Received from Certain Member States Regarding Guidelinesfor the
Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and Technology, Doc. INFCIRC/254/Rev. 1/Part 1,
Annex B, item 5.1.2(a) (July 1992), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/
Infcircs/Others/inf254rlpl.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
220.

CRS Report, supra note 214, at 3-4.
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In sum, although China engaged in a number of troublesome
nuclear export activities during this period, the only clear NPT violation was the export of ring magnets to Pakistan. Moreover,
assuming that some of China's other nuclear exports during this
period also violated international nonproliferation norms, Goldsmith and Posner's rational choice model does not really explain
those violations. To understand why, it is helpful to review the history of Chinese export controls.
Prior to China's economic modernization program, which began
in 1978, there was virtually no private sector in China. Government entities were responsible for almost all significant exports, so
it was easy for the government to regulate exports. Economic modernization, however, brought privatization, including a burgeoning
military-industrial complex. 22 1 Throughout the 1980s, semi-privatized firms with close ties to the military pursued export markets to
generate income. During the 1980s, China did not have formal
export control regulations; rather, exports were regulated, if at all,
"through the informal clan networks to which the heads of the relevant industries and top Communist party officials belong[ed] .,222
China's first real export control regulations, promulgated by the
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC)
in 1991 and 1992, were designed primarily to empower MOFTEC
to acquire information about what the ever-growing private sector
was exporting, not to implement China's nonproliferation commitments. 2 23 It was not until the mid-1990s that China enacted export
control regulations that were intended to stem the flow of prolifer224
ation-related exports.
In light of this history, it seems very unlikely that Chinese violations of nonproliferation norms during this period resulted from
the type of rationalistic cost-benefit analysis that, according to Limits, drives state decision-making related to international law. The
better view is that, prior to the mid-1990s, China had not enacted
the domestic laws and regulations necessary to block exports of

221.
China).
222.
223.
224.

See Davis, supra note 178, at 595-97 (explaining the evolution of export controls in
Id. at 598.
Id. at 596-97.
See JING-DONG YUAN, STRENGTHENING CHINA'S EXPORT CONTROL SYSTEM (2002)

(summarizing a series of proliferation export regulations that China promulgated from
1994 to 1998), http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/dmemo.pdf (last visited Oct. 18,

2005).
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items of proliferation concern. 22 5 Moreover, the delay in enacting
such laws and regulations was largely the product of institutional
inertia, not rational choice.
D.

China's NonproliferationPolicies and Practices: 1996 to Present

Since the mid-1990s, China has internalized nuclear nonproliferation norms by enacting export control laws and regulations that
largely track international control lists. China has also become a
member of the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers
Group. Chinese export practices during this period have been
fully compliant with the NPT obligation not to export EDP equipment and materials in the absence of IAEA safeguards. However,
despite China's vastly improved export control regulations, Chinese firms continue to provide unspecified assistance and dual-use
items to entities associated with Iran and Pakistan's nuclear
programs.
1.

Domestic Export Controls

In May 1997 the Chinese government issued a "Circular on Strict
Implementation of China's Nuclear Export Policy." 2 26 In September 1997, the government published "Regulations on Nuclear
Export Control." The list of controlled items was identical to the
list included in Part I of the NSG guidelines. 227 In June 1998 China
issued regulations governing dual-use exports. 228 Over the past several years, China has continued to amend its export control regulations in an effort to keep pace with changes in multilateral export
controls. For example, China amended its domestic nuclear
export control regulations in June 2001 to incorporate recent
225. The ad hoc system that existed in the 1980s and early 1990s probably blocked
some exports of proliferation concern. According to one knowledgeable commentator,
the top leaders were "not normally excluded from decision making on sensitive exports."
Davis, supra note 178, at 599. But the political leadership would not know about "sensitive
exports" unless private sector firms fiotified their contacts in relevant government ministries and the bureaucrats within those ministries notified their political superiors. It is
reasonable to assume that the political leadership would be informed if all the relevant
players knew what was "sensitive." But without any formal regulations listing "sensitive"
items, there were undoubtedly numerous cases where private sector firms exported items
without the knowledge of the political leadership, and those items were later found to be
"sensitive" because U.S. diplomats complained to officials in the foreign ministry. On the
other hand, one cannot exclude the possibility that there were also cases where the political leadership was informed in advance about "sensitive exports" and gave its approval.
226. YUAN, supra note 224.
227. Id. Part I of the NSG guidelines addresses EDP equipment and materials. Part II
addresses dual-use items. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
228. YuAN, supra note 224.
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amendments to the Zangger Committee trigger list.229 A Chinese
government "white paper" published in December 2003 stated that
China's export control lists "are almost the same as those of the
Zangger Committee, Nuclear Suppliers Group, CWC, Australia
230
Group, and MTCR."
The recent internalization of international norms into China's
export control regulations raises two questions: First, why did
China enact nuclear export control regulations? Second, why did
China choose to adopt regulations that are essentially identical to
international control lists?
China's decision to enact formal export control regulations is
largely attributable to revelations about the export of ring magnets
to Pakistan. U.S. news media first published stories about the ring
magnets in February 1996.231 These stories prompted some members of Congress to call for sanctions on China. 23 2 The Clinton
Administration resisted the pressure for sanctions, in part because
Chinese leaders "insisted they were not aware of the magnet transfer." 23 3 Instead of sanctions, the United States extracted a new
promise from China. On May 10, 1996, U.S. officials announced
"that China promised to provide future assistance only to safeguarded nuclear facilities." 23 4 This promise went beyond China's
NPT obligations "by expanding them to cover dual-use nuclear
items or any nonnuclear goods to unsafeguarded facilities in Pakistan or other countries." 23 5 The desire to follow through on this
229. See International Atomic Energy Agency, Communication of 15 November 2001
Received from the People's Republic of China Regarding the Export of NuclearMaterialand of Certain
Categories of Equipment and Other Material, Doc. INFCIRC/209/Rev.2/Add.2, 2 (Feb. 14,
2002) (noting that China felt it desirable to amend its control list), http://www.iaea.org/
Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2002/infcirc209r2a2.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005). See
also Testimony of Daniel Pinkston Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, Table 2 (Mar. 10, 2005) [hereinafter Pinkston Testimony] (noting various
Chinese export control laws and regulations implemented since the 1990s), http://cns.
miis.edu/research/congress/testim/pinkston.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).
230. CRS Report, supra note 214, at 2. The "CWC" is the Chemical Weapons Convention. The "Australia Group" is an international supplier group that deals with exports of
equipment and materials relevant to chemical weapons proliferation. The "MTCR," or
missile technology control regime, is an international supplier group that deals with
exports of materials and equipment relevant to missile proliferation. The Australia Group
and the MTCR, like the NSG, are groups of like-minded supplier countries whose actions
are guided by informal agreements, not treaty obligations.
231. Id. at 3.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Evan S. Medeiros, The Changing Characterof China's WMD ProliferationActivities, in
NATIONAL

INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL

CONFERENCE

REPORT,

CHINA

AND WEAPONS
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promise, in addition to its NPT obligations, was one of the key factors underlying China's decision to enact nuclear export control
regulations.
Goldsmith and Posner might explain this as a simple case of
coercion: the threat of U.S. sanctions prompted China to enact
export control regulations. While coercion is certainly part of the
story, it is not the whole story. China's commitment not to provide
dual-use items to unsafeguarded facilities went beyond what was
necessary to avoid U.S. sanctions, 236 or to comply with its NPT obligations. This suggests that Chinese leaders were persuaded that it
would be contrary to China's security interests to permit continued
exports of dual-use items to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. 23 7 As
noted in Part III, the process of persuasion is different from the
process of coercion. 238 The coercion model set forth in Limits does
not really account for the way in which persuasion can be used to
transform a state's perception of its own interests.
Moreover, the coercion model cannot explain why Chinese
export control regulations are virtually identical to international
control lists. The United States has imposed sanctions on Chinese
entities for exports of items that are not subject to international
controls,2 39 and it has refrained from imposing sanctions for
240 If
exports of items that are subject to international controls.
DESTRUcrION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES (1999) (emphasis in original), availa-

ble at www.odci.gov/nic/confreports_chinawmd.html (last visited July 9, 2005).
236. Over the years, Congress has enacted a variety of statutes that impose sanctions
for various types of proliferation-related behavior. For a brief summary of relevant legislation, see CRS Report, supra note 214, at 25-27, 31-34. A detailed analysis of all the relevant sanctions legislation is beyond the scope of this Review. To the best of this author's
knowledge, though, Congress has never enacted legislation to impose sanctions for exports
of nonnuclear goods to unsafeguarded facilities in countries other than Iran and Iraq.
237. See, e.g., Leonard S. Spector, Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission, Hearing on China's Proliferation Policies and Practices (July
24, 2003) [hereinafter Spector Testimony] (noting that there has been "a significant shift
in Chinese views about the potential for WMD proliferation to have a negative impact on
regional stability and on China's own security"), http://www.cns.miis.edu/research/congress/testim/testlsp.htm (last visited July 1, 2005).
238. See supra notes 112-119 and accompanying text.
239. See Spector Testimony, supra note 237, ("The most recent U.S. sanctions against
China... appear to be for transfers of dual-use goods that are not specifically included on
international control lists."). Most of the recent U.S. sanctions against China have been for
missile proliferation, not nuclear proliferation. See CRS Report, supra note 214, at 21-24.
However, Bush Administration officials indicated that sanctions imposed in April 2004 for
exports to Iran also involved some nuclear-related items. See id. at 10 (discussing testimony
of Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf).
240. For example, the United States did not impose sanctions on China for the export
of ring magnets to Pakistan, even though the magnets are controlled items under both the
Zangger and NSG lists. See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text.
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China's primary interest was to avoid U.S. sanctions, the rational
choice would be to tailor its domestic export control lists to U.S.
sanctions legislation. Instead, China incorporated internationally
agreed-upon lists into its domestic export control regulations, and
it did so even before it joined the groups that promulgated those
lists.241 China's "mimicry" of international lists strongly suggests
that internalization of nuclear nonproliferation norms is being
242
driven by the forces of acculturation, not coercion.
2.

Membership in International Groups

China joined the Zangger Committee in October 1997;243 it
joined the NSG in May 2004.244 China's decision to join the Zangger Committee did not require any significant change in China's
behavior. The primary commitment associated with Zangger membership is to adhere to the NPT requirement not to export EDP
items to unsafeguarded facilities. China had already joined the
NPT several years earlier, in 1992.245 Furthermore, China had published detailed nuclear export control regulations that essentially
implemented its commitments as a Zangger Committee member. 246 Thus, once China published nuclear export regulations in
September 1997, it was an easy decision to join the Zangger Committee. Goldsmith and Posner can explain this development as a
rational choice that offered China modest benefits without any real
offsetting costs.
In contrast, the decision to join the NSG in 2004 did entail significant costs for China. During the 1990s, China built a safeguarded nuclear power plant for Pakistan at Chashma. 24 7 In May
2004, "China signed a contract to build a second nuclear power
241. China enacted export control regulations for EDP items in September 1997,
before joining the Zangger Committee in October 1997. China enacted controls for dualuse nuclear-related exports in June 1998, but did not join the NSG until 2004. See supra
notes 224-225 and accompanying text; infra notes 243-244 and accompanying text.
242. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 112, at 638 (identifying "mimicry" as one of
several acculturation processes), 645-46 (distinguishing acculturation from coercion).
243. CRS Report, supra note 214, at 2.
244. Pinkston Testimony, supra note 229.
245. See supra note 192.
246. China's September 1997 nuclear export control regulations tracked part 1 of the
NSG guidelines, rather than the Zangger guidelines. See supra note 224 and accompanying
text. Because the NSG and the Zangger Committee are independent, and both groups
have amended their trigger lists several times, the two lists are not necessarily identical.
Even so, the Zangger list is very similar to the list contained in part 1 of the NSG guidelines. Therefore, by incorporating part 1 of the NSG guidelines into its domestic laws
China effectively incorporated the Zangger list as well.
247. CRS Report, supra note 214, at 4.
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Since these reactors are sub-

ject to IAEA safeguards, China's work on the reactors is fully consistent with its NPT obligations and with Zangger Committee
guidelines. NSG members, however, agreed in 1992 to require
"full-scope safeguards" as a condition of supply. 249 Full-scope safeguards means that all nuclear activities in the recipient state must
be subject to IAEA safeguards. Pakistan does not satisfy that condition. China joined the NSG shortly after signing the contract to
build Chashma-2 for Pakistan. 250 Under the current NSG guidelines, new NSG members are allowed to fulfill pre-existing contracts with states that do not have full-scope safeguards.2 5 1 China,
therefore, is expected to complete construction of the new power
reactor in Pakistan. Byjoining the NSG, however, China effectively
252
agreed not to supply any additional power reactors to Pakistan.
That agreement entails significant economic costs in the form of
lost revenues. Perhaps more importantly, it entails significant
political costs because Pakistan is one of China's closest allies, and
nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan has been an
important part of that political relationship for more than two
decades.
China incurs additional costs by joining the NSG because NSG
253
members have agreed to control exports of dual-use items.
Export controls on dual-use items are costly in two senses. First,
Chinese firms lose revenue whenever the government blocks
exports of dual-use items that raise proliferation concerns. Second, in order for export controls over dual-use items to be effective, China must expend substantial government funds to create
and maintain the bureaucracy necessary to enforce compliance
with those export control regulations. 2 54 These costs are similar to
248. Id. at 5.
249. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
250. See CRS Report, supra note 214 at 5-6. See also Pinkston Testimony, supra note 229
(stating that China joined the NSG in May 2004).
251. See INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 1, 1 4(a)-4(d) (Feb. 2005), available at www.iaea.
org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/index/html (last visited Oct. 28, 2005).
252. This assumes that Pakistan will not join the NPT. Pakistan has said that it would
join the NPT, or accept full-scope safeguards, if India does so. India, however, refuses to
join the NPT as long as the five nuclear weapon states retain their nuclear weapons.,
Hence, it is likely that Pakistan will not join the NPT for the foreseeable future.
253. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
254. As noted above, China first enacted domestic export controls over dual use items
in 1998, several years before it joined the NSG. Technically, these costs are associated with
domestic export controls over dual-use items, not with NSG membership. Regardless, the
commitment to control dual-use exports goes beyond China's NPT obligations, and entails
significant costs in addition to the costs inherent in NPT membership.
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the costs associated with implementing export controls for EDP
items, but controlling exports of dual-use items is more difficult,
2 55
and hence more costly.
Limits suggests that states do not make international commitments unless the benefits outweigh the costs. 25 6 Given the costs
associated with NSG membership, what are the offsetting benefits
for China? There appear to be three distinct benefits. First, implementation of dual-use export controls may help China avoid U.S.
sanctions. 2 57 Second, China may have been persuaded that the
NSG's full-scope safeguards policy and dual-use export controls
promote China's security interests. Third, China probably believes
that there are significant reputational benefits associated with NSG
258
membership.
The first explanation is entirely consistent with Limits' coercion
model. The second explanation, however, implies that China has
internalized nuclear nonproliferation norms through a process of
persuasion, rather than coercion. As noted above, Limits' rational
choice theory does not adequately account for the way in which
persuasion modifies a state's perception of its interests. 2 59 Finally,
the third explanation assumes that China gains a reputational benefit by complying with NSG guidelines. Assuming that is true, the
255. There are two reasons why controlling exports of dual-use items is more difficult.
First, there are more firms involved in exports of dual-use items than EDP items. The
greater number of firms makes it more difficult and costly for the government to monitor
their exports. Second, most suppliers of EDP items are aware of nuclear export control
regulations because they are in the "nuclear business." Since they are aware of the regulations, they know they are supposed to apply for an export license. By contrast, dual-use
nuclear export controls include controls over a variety of industrial equipment, such as
robots and machine tools. See International Atomic Energy Agency, Communications
Received From CertainMember States Regarding Guidelines of Transfers of Nuclear-RelatedDual-Use
Equipment, Materials, Software, and Related Technology, Doc. INFCIRC/254/Rev.6/Part 2
(Feb. 23, 2005) (current NSG dual-use guidelines), http://www.iaea.org/Publications/
Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc254r6p2.pdf (last visited Sept. 2, 2005).
Many of the
firms that export these types of items are not in the "nuclear business," and hence are less
likely to be aware of nuclear export control regulations. It is difficult and costly for the
government to monitor the behavior of firms who do not know that they are supposed to
apply for an export license before they export their products.
256. LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 89.
257. See Pinkston Testimony, supra note 229, at 5 (noting that the Chinese Ministry of
Foreign Affairs "has been particularly concerned about avoiding U.S. sanctions, and has
reportedly stopped transfers from occurring where no Chinese law would have been broken but where U.S. sanctions may have occurred").
258. See Spector Testimony, supra note 237, at 5 ("Beijing is actually sensitive to international opinion and wary about being isolated in international settings. China does not
want to be viewed as violating established international norms by proliferating weapons of
mass destruction.").
259. See supra notes 117-119 and accompanying text.
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benefit exists because the international community believes that
the norms embodied in the NSG guidelines are important. If
other states and transnational actors did not think those norms
were important, China could not possibly gain a reputational benefit by complying with them. The reputational benefit associated
with NSG membership, therefore, derives from the normative
force of the NSG guidelines. Since Goldsmith and Posner deny
2 60
that states respond to the normative pull of international law,
their theory fails to account for the relationship between international norms and a state's reputational interests.
3.

Recent Chinese Nuclear Exports

The overall record of Chinese nuclear exports since the mid1990s is quite positive in three respects. First, since the export of
ring magnets to Pakistan in the mid-1990s, there have not been any
published reports alleging Chinese exports of EDP items to
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. It thus appears that China has
complied fully with its obligations under NPT Article III for the
past decade. This suggests that basic NPT norms have been internalized into China's nuclear export practices.
Second, in response to U.S. pressure, China has terminated
some proposed nuclear cooperation with Iran that would have
been legal under the NPT and permissible under the NSG guidelines. 261 China has also blocked exports of items that are not listed
on any multilateral nuclear export control list.262 These actions
demonstrate China's willingness to go beyond its NPT and NSG
commitments, at least in some cases, in order to satisfy U.S. nonproliferation concerns. Insofar as China is willing to take actions
that go beyond its international commitments, these actions are
best explained in terms of coercion, rather than norm
internalization.
260. See LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, supra note 7, at 14-15.
261. In the early 1990s, China signed several contracts for nuclear exports to Iran,
including contracts to supply two nuclear power reactors and a uranium hexafluoride production facility. See Medeiros, supra note 235. These proposed exports complied with NSG
guidelines because Iran, as an NPT party, has a full-scope safeguards agreement with the
IAEA. Even so, in response to U.S. pressure, China agreed in 1997 to cancel these projects
and "to halt all future nuclear cooperation with Iran." Id
262. For example, in 1998 a Chinese firm was negotiating with an Iranian nuclear
research center to supply "hundreds of tons of anhydrous hydrogen fluoride (AHF)." CRS
Report, supra note 214, at 9. AHF is not listed on any nuclear control list, but it could be
used in the production of uranium hexafluoride, which is a feed material for uranium
enrichment facilities. In response to pressure by the United States, "Beijing stopped the
sale." Id
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Third, some reported Chinese exports that have raised nuclear
proliferation concerns appear to be consistent with multilateral
export control regulations. For example, in 2002 a Chinese company reportedly sold "North Korea 20 tons of tributyl phosphate
(TBP), a dual-use chemical that U.S. intelligence reportedly
believed would be used in the North Korean nuclear weapons program." 263 TBP is not one of the dual-use materials listed in the
current version of the NSG's dual-use guidelines.2 64 Similarly, a
1999 report indicated that a Chinese company "'revived' negotiations with the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization on the construction of a plant to produce graphite." 2 65 Nuclear grade
graphite is one of the materials listed in the original Zangger and
NSG trigger lists266 because it can be used as a moderator in a
nuclear reactor. Neither the Zangger Committee nor the NSG,
however, lists graphite production plants as an item subject to mul267
tilateral export controls.
Although the overall picture is quite positive, government officials have made a variety of statements over the past several years
revealing ongoing concerns about Chinese nuclear cooperation
with Iran and Pakistan. InJuly 2003 the Assistant Secretary of State
for Verification and Compliance testified that "China continues to
268
contribute to the nuclear programs of both Pakistan and Iran."
Similarly, in an unclassified report to Congress covering the period
from January to June 2003, the Central Intelligence Agency stated:
"We cannot rule out, however, some continued contacts .
between Chinese entities and entities associated with Pakistan's
nuclear weapons program." 269 In April 2004 the Bush Administra263. Id. at 17.
264. See International Atomic Energy Agency, Communications Received From Certain
Member States Regarding Guidelinesfor Transfers of Nuclear-relatedDual-use Equipment, Materials,
Software and Related Technology, Doc. INFCIRC/254/Rev.6/Part 2 (Feb. 23, 2005), http://
www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2005/infcirc254r6p2.pdf
(last visited
Oct. 18, 2005).
265. CRS Report, supra note 214, at 9.
266. See INFCIRC/209, supra note 167; INFCIRC/254, supra note 169.
267. See INFCIRC/209/Rev. 2 (Mar. 2000); INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 1 (Feb. 2005),
available at www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/index/html (last visited Oct.
28, 2005).
268. DeSutter Testimony, supra note 140.
269. CIA Report, supra note 213, at 10. Interestingly, the next version of the CIA
report, which covered the period from July to December 2003, did not repeat this statement. See Director of Central Intelligence, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced ConventionalMunitions, I July
Through 31 December 2003, at 10, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/uly-dec2003.pdf (last visited Oct. 18, 2005).

HeinOnline -- 38 Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev. 205 2006

The Geo. Wash. Int'l L. Rev.

[Vol. 38

tion imposed sanctions on several Chinese firms under the Iran
Nonproliferation Act. "Assistant Secretary of State John Wolf testified . . .that 'most' of the sanctions related to non-nuclear trans270
fers, but there were concerns in the nuclear area as well."
It is difficult to know how best to construe these statements
because the details underlying these general expressions of concern have not been made publicly available. U.S. concerns may be
partially attributable to the fact that the United States is pressing
China to block exports of items that are not subject to multilateral
controls, and China is resisting that pressure. 27 1 Alternatively, it is
possible that some Chinese firms are exporting controlled, dualuse items in contravention of export control regulations, and U.S.
concerns reflect the Chinese government's inability to control private sector exports. A third possibility is that some officials within
the Chinese government are condoning or encouraging ongoing
nuclear exports.
Whichever explanation is correct, there is no doubt that China's
nuclear export practices have improved considerably over the past
twenty years. In the early 1980s, China was actively assisting Pakistan's nuclear weapons program and exporting EDP items to
unsafeguarded nuclear facilities in several countries. In the past
few years, even if one assumes the worst, it appears that Chinese
firms may still be supplying some dual use items to nuclear related
end users in Iran and Pakistan.
V.

CONCLUSION

At the outset of this Review, I suggested that theories of compliance with international law can be divided into three groups: state
interest theories, domestic politics theories, and international
norms theories. 272 The Limits of International Law falls squarely
within the state interest camp. It presents a theoretically elegant
model that explains state behavior related to international law in
terms of state interests.
The examples presented in this Review analyze cases where powerful states have internalized international norms after many years
of opposing those norms. Despite more than two decades of con270. CRS Report, supra note 214, at 10.
271. See Spector Testimony, supra note 237(noting that "[a)s the United States pushes
China to move beyond compliance with international standards to accommodate specific
U.S. security interests, tensions with China over nonproliferation issues are likely to
increase ...").
272. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
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sistent opposition to the international norm prohibiting the juvenile death penalty, the United States internalized that norm by
incorporating it into domestic constitutional law. 273 Similarly, after
fifteen years of persistent opposition to nuclear nonproliferation
norms, China gradually abandoned its opposition and incorporated international norms into its domestic export control regulations. 274 Other scholars have documented numerous other cases
of norm internalization. 275 Dean Koh has persuasively argued that
norm internalization is the key to compliance with international
law. 2 76 The Limits of InternationalLaw does not adequately account
for the process of norm internalization. The book's failure to
address the connection between compliance and norm internalization weakens the explanatory power of Goldsmith and Posner's
theory.
For a theory of international law to be truly comprehensive, it
must account for at least three things: 1) how state interests shape
the international legal system; 2) how the international legal system shapes state behavior; and 3) how domestic political forces
influence the interaction between states and the international legal
system. The authors of Limits deserve praise for presenting a
sophisticated analysis of the first point. Their theory is not nearly
as comprehensive as they claim, however, because they largely
ignore the influence of domestic politics, and they stubbornly deny
the fact that international norms actually do influence state
behavior.

273.
274.
275.
276.

See supra Part III.C.
See supra Part IV.
See supra note 12.
See Koh, supra note 6.
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